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Abstract
This Comment argues that the IGC should reject proposals to exempt sports associations from
Community law, because freedom of movement for workers is a strictly protected right of fun-
damental importance to the European Union and because the public’s interest in sport and the
sporting associations’ interest in maintaining financial and competitive balance between clubs are
better served by alternatives to the transfer system that do not obstruct freedom of movement. Part
I discusses the importance of the common market in the European Union and outlines Community
law designed to maintain the common market. Part I also discusses application of those measures
in the context of sport, including a description of organized professional football and the rules
regarding freedom of movement for players. Part II presents the background of the dispute in
Bosman, followed by an analysis of the ECJ’s ruling declaring the transfer system and the rules
on foreign players incompatible with Community law. Part III argues that amending the Treaty
on European Union (“TEU”) to exempt sports associations from Community law on freedom of
movement for workers would be inappropriate in light of the importance of freedom of movement
in the European Union and the transfer system’s failure to promote any legitimate goals. Part III
advocates that viable alternatives exist to replace the transfer system without obstructing freedom
of movement. This Comment concludes that an amendment to the TEU would create a dangerous
precedent in favor of unjustified obstructions to freedom of movement for workers in an entire
segment of the EU internal market, thereby threatening the existence of the common market itself.
THE BOSMAN CASE: PROTECTING FREEDOM OF
MOVEMENT IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL
Andrew L. Lee*
INTRODUCTION
While tension between management and labor may exist in
every industry, it dominates the professional sports industry1 in
the 1990's.2 The unique characteristics of the sports industry,
such as highly specialized job functions and varying levels of
skills, affect the nature of agreements between employers and
employees by making it difficult to characterize their respective
rights.' Controversy commonly arises over the right, known as
free agency,4 of professional athletes to change teams or clubs at
the end of their contracts without restriction.5 Players argue that
restraints on movement interfere with their freedom to work
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University. This Comment is dedicated to Kelly,
for her love and patience, and to our families. I would also like to thank Samuel R. Hill,
Esq. of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn LLP, for his contributions.
1. Peter N. Katz, Comment, A History of Free Agency in the United States and Great
Britain: Who's Leading the Charge?, 15 CoMp. LAB. L.J. 371 (1994).
Imagine telling a law student from [Fordham University] that her rights to
practice law have been obtained by a law firm in Anchorage, Alaska, and her
only options are to practice law there or in another country. This concept.
seems quite ridiculous[, but] it is exactly what happens to . . . virtually all
professional athletes when they try to move within their respective markets.
Id. at 371.
2. Sports Log, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 22, 1996, at 32. According to a study by the
Associated Press, the lowest increase since 1989 in salary arbitration for Major League
Baseball players is the 1996 73 % average increase. Id. See also Jones Facing Future Shock:
The Cowboys Owner Must Deal With Looming Higher Salaries to Keep His Team Intact, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 28, 1996, at Sports 13 (discussing expected National Foot-
ball League ("NFL") salary cap increase from US$37.1 million to approximately US$40-
42 million).
3. Joseph Z. Fleming et al., Analysis of Relevant Labor, Employment Discrimination, and
Humanitarian Relief Laws Affecting the Sports, Arts, and Entertainment Industries, C627 ALI-
ABA COURSE OF STUDY 507, 511 (1991). Consider, for example, the recent lockout that
threatened to wipe out the entire 1995 National Hockey League season and the pro-
longed 1995 strike in Major League Baseball. Gary Roberts, The Salary Cap in Profes-
sional Sports: Overview & Commentary, SPORTS LAw., Spring 1995, at 1, 5. These situations
result, in large part, from "the fundamental philosophical difference in views about how
sports should be organized and governed and who should assume risks and get rewards
for the productive activity of [a] league." Id.
4. See Richard E. Bartok, NFL Free Agency Restrictions Under Antitrust Attack, 2 DUKE
L.J. 503, 503 n. 1 (1991) ("Free agency is the system that enables professional athletes to
change sports teams after their contracts expire.").
5. Katz, supra note 1, at 416.
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where they want to, at salaries determined on the open market.6
Club owners and leagues respond that restraint practices main-
tain competitive balance within a professional league.7
In the European Union,8 league-imposed restrictions on a
player's ability to change clubs at the end of his contract9 amplify
6. Shant H. Chalian, Note, Fourth and Goal: Player Restraints in Professional Sports, a
Look Back and a Look Ahead, 67 ST.JOHN'S L. REV. 593, 594 (1993); see also Flood v. Kuhn
407 U.S. 258, 265-66 (1972) (discussing professional baseball player's claim that Major
League Baseball restrictions on player movement amounted to form of involuntary ser-
vitude); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F. Supp. 867, 873-74 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (discussing claim that National Basketball Association draft, uniform player con-
tract, and reserve clause violated antitrust laws by allocating and dividing market of
professional player talent).
7. Chalian, supra note 6, at 594; see Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 621 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing NFL's unsuccessful defense of Rozelle Rule, which
forced compensation for transfers of free agents, on grounds that it promoted competi-
tive balance between clubs).
8. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [19921 1
C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [hereinafter TEU] (amending Treaty Establishing the Eu-
ropean Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-11) [hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987)). The TEU established a single
Union comprised of the three European communities already in existence. Id. art. A,
3, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727. The TEU represents the latest
stage in the process of creating an "ever closer union among the peoples of Europe."
Id. The TEU modifies and adds to the Treaties establishing the three European com-
munities, but it does not replace them. P.S.R.F. MATHIJSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN
UNION LAW 4 (6th ed. 1995). "The Union shall respect the national identities of its
Member States, whose systems of government are founded on the principles of democ-
racy." TEU, supra, art. F(1), OJ. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 728. The
Communities, which continue to fulfill their respective responsibilities, form the first of
the "three pillars" upon which the European Union is based. DERRICK WYATr & ALAN
DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAw 655 (3d ed. 1993). The second and third pil-
lars identified by the TEU, are, respectively, Provisions on a Common Foreign and Se-
curity Policy (C.F.S.P.) and Provisions on Co-operation in the fields ofjustice and home
affairs. TEU, supra, tits. V, VI, O.J. C 224/1, at 94, 97 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 729,
735. The reference to "pillars" is derived from the image of a Greek temple: an illustra-
tion of the structure of the European Union. WYATT, supra, at 655. The term "Euro-
pean Union" refers to the political relationship between the three pillars. Id. Member
States were not ready to include the second and third pillars within the "European
Community," therefore, the structure of the three pillars was created. Id. That struc-
ture is held together by "a single institutional framework" which functions to ensure the
consistency and the continuity of the activities carried out in order to attain EU objec-
tives while at the same time respecting and building upon the acquis communautaire.
TEU, supra, art. C, OJ. C 224/1, at5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727. The term acquis
communautaire refers to the body of rules governing the Communities in any field of
activity. MATHIJSEN, supra, at 6 n.7.
9. See Soccer in the Dock; the Bosman Trial Promises to Change the Face of European Foot-
ball, ECONOMIST, June 17, 1995, at 90 (discussing "transfer system" in European football,
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the free agency debate.1" Specific provisions of Community law
protect the right of workers to move freely between Member
States for employment-related purposes.1 In contrast, a similar
right to travel between states exists in United States law,
although there is no such express provision for this right in the
U.S. Constitution.1 2
Under Community law,1 3 the express protection of freedom
of movement for workers' 4 is designed to promote the establish-
ment of the common market, one of the European Union's
main goals.' 5 Nevertheless, the transfer system has traditionally
limited the bargaining positions of players by putting control of
player movement in the hands of club management.1 6 Accord-
ingly, until recently, free agency did not exist in European foot-
ball. 17
The Court of Justice18 ("ECJ"), in Union Royale Belge des
Sociit s de Football Ass'n v. Bosman,19 recently changed the nature
under which players whose contracts expire may not be employed by another club un-
less transfer fee is exchanged). The sport known as soccer in the United States and
Canada is known by most of the world as football. Katz, supra note 1, at 397. This
Comment uses "football" in order to avoid confusion with U.S. football.
10. Paul Gains, A Fight for Free-Agent Rights in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1995, at
18.
11. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, art. 48, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992]
1 C.M.L.R. 573, 612 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made &y TEU, supra
note 8, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] C.M.L.R. 719 (prohibiting obstacles to freedom of
movement for workers).
12. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAw 470 (1993) (discussing free movement of workers in United States and citing sev-
eral U.S. Supreme Court cases protecting that right).
13. MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 4. The term "Community" refers to the European
Economic Community ("EEC"). Id. The other two communities, the European Coal
and Steel Community ("ECSC") and the European Atomic Energy Community
("Euratom"), have essentially been absorbed into the EEC, therefore, the name "Com-
munity" is mostly used in the singular. Id. at 4 n.3.
14. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
15. See id. arts. 2-3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-80 (providing for establishment of
common market).
•.16. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing transfer system in Euro-
pean football).
17. See Gains, supra note 10, at 18 ("Free agency doesn't exist in European soc-
cer.").
18. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 164, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684. The European
Court ofJustice ("ECJ") is the highest authority on the interpretation of Community
Law. Id.
19. Union Royale Beige des Soci&ts de Football Ass'n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93
(Eur. Ct.J. Dec. 15, 1995) (not yet reported).
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of labor relations in EU professional sports by introducing free
agency to the European Union. ° Invoking provisions of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community21 ("EC Treaty")
that guarantee freedom of movement to workers22 and prohibit
discrimination based on nationality, 23 the ECJ dismantled Euro-
pean football's century-old transfer system24 and rules which lim-
ited the number of foreign players fielded 25 by clubs.2 6 In re-
sponse to Bosman, football clubs and associations seeking to
maintain as much of their bargaining power as possible 7 are
lobbying28 Member State governments for an amendment of the
EC Treaty to exempt sports associations from Community law on
freedom of movement for workers. 9 If Member State3 0 govern-
20. Christopher Clarey, Free Agency Crosses the Atlantic, Anxiety on Board, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 20, 1995, at 21(1). "No longer will players be tied to their clubs after their con-
tracts expire. Instead, they theoretically will become American-style free agents, able to
negotiate with other clubs in the European Union, which, henceforth, will not have to
pay a transfer fee for their services." Id.
21. EC Treaty, supra note 11, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573.
22. Id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
23. Id. arts. 6, 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591, 612.
24. See Katz, supra note 1, at 400-01 (discussing evolution of Britain's Football
League, which operated under transfer system since its inception in 1888).
25. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Union Royale Beige des Soci6t6s de
Football Ass'n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, slip op. at 16, 37 (Eur. Ct.J. Sept. 20, 1995)
(Court decision not yet reported). Since the 1960's, most football associations have
operated under rules restricting the possibility of fielding players of foreign nationality
as a means of ensuring local interest and maintaining fan support. Id.
26. Bosman, slip op. at 27.
27. See Bert Lauwers, EU, UEFA Step Up Warfare Over Bosman Soccer Case, REUTERS
EUR. COMMUNiTY REP., Jan. 18, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File
(discussing football associations intention to maintain rules on foreign players and
transfer rules, at least for the 1995-96 season, despite immediate effect of Bosmanjudg-
ment).
28. IGC T96: UK and European Parliabment Produce Shopping List, EUR. REP., Mar. 16,
1996, available in LEXIS News Library, CURNWS File (discussing Opinion of European
Parliament calling for recognition of sport in new treaty). Free Movement of People: Bel-
gian Premier Says IGC Should Examine Football Rules, EUR. REP., Dec. 20, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File (reporting Union of European Football Associa-
tion's ("UEFA") calls for IGC on treaty reform to treat rules of sporting associations as
special).
29. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
30. TEU, supra note 8, pmbl., OJ. C 224/1, at 2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 725.
Until 1995, there were 12 EU Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United
Kingdom. Id. On January 1, 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden acceded to the Euro-
pean Union. Fact Sheet: European Union, U.S. Dep't of State Dispatch, June 26, 1995, at
524. Cyprus, Malta, Turkey, Switzerland, Poland, and Hungary recently applied for
membership, and other Central European states have indicated their desire tojoin. Id.
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ments agree to propose the amendment,"1 the issue could be
raised at the intergovernmental conference 2 ("IGC") scheduled
to begin at the end of March 1996."s
This Comment argues that the IGC should reject proposals
to exempt sports associations from Community law, because
freedom of movement for workers is a strictly protected right of
fundamental importance to the European Union and because
the public's interest in sport and the sporting associations' inter-
est in maintaining financial and competitive balance between
clubs are better served by alternatives to the transfer system that
do not obstruct freedom of movement. Part I discusses the im-
portance of the common market in the European Union and
outlines Community law designed to maintain the common mar-
ket. Part I also discusses application of those measures in the
context of sport, including a description of organized profes-
sional football and the rules regarding freedom of movement for
players. Part II presents the background of the dispute in Bos-
man, followed by an analysis of the ECJ's ruling declaring the
transfer system and the rules on foreign players incompatible
with Community law. Part III argues that amending the Treaty
on European Union 4 ("TEU") to exempt sports associations
from Community law on freedom of movement for workers
would be inappropriate in light of the importance of freedom of
movement in the European Union and the transfer system's fail-
ure to promote any legitimate goals. Part III advocates that via-
ble alternatives exist to replace the transfer system without ob-
31. See TEU, supra note 8, art. N(2), O.J. C 224/1, at99 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R.
at 739 (providing for conference of Member State governments in 1996 to discuss revi-
sion of TEU).
The government of any Member State or the Commission may submit to the
Council proposals for the amendment of the Treaties on which the Union is
founded.
If the Council, after consulting the European Parliament and, where ap-
propriate, the Commission, delivers an opinion in favor of calling a confer-
ence of representatives of the governments of the Member States, the confer-
ence shall be convened by the President of the Council for the purpose of
determining by common accord the amendments to be made to those Trea-
ties ....
Id. art. N(1), OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
32. See id. (setting forth procedure for amendment of TEU by conference of Mem-
ber State governments).
33. Jude Webber, Italian Olympic Body Wants Bosman Ruling on IGC Agenda, REUtER
EUR. COMMUNITY REP., Jan. 27, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
34. TEU, supra note 8, OJ. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R 719.
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structing freedom of movement. This Comment concludes that
an amendment to the TEU would create a dangerous precedent
in favor of unjustified obstructions to freedom of movement for
workers in an entire segment of the EU internal market, thereby
threatening the existence of the common market itself.
I. MEASURES IMPLEMENTING THE GOALS OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
THE FIELD OF SPORT
The EU goal of establishing a common market35 involves
eliminating barriers to the movement of the factors of produc-
tion across Member State boundaries36 and maintaining effective
competition in the market.37 EC Treaty Article 48 provides for
the freedom of movement for workers,38 while Articles 85 and 86
establish the EC competition rules.39 These provisions, as imple-
mented and interpreted by the EU institutions,4" affect sports in
the Community by regulating rules and agreements that influ-
ence player movement 4l and market competition.
A. EC Treaty Provisions on Freedom of Movement and Competition
Community law aims to eliminate economic and political
barriers between Member States,43 thereby establishing a com-
mon market. 44 Article 4841 contributes to this goal by guarantee-
ing EU citizens46 the freedom to move throughout the Commu-
35. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (establishing
common market is principal means of achieving Community tasks).
36. See id. art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (providing for elimination of barriers
between Member States to free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital).
37. See id. arts. 85, 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28 (EC competition rules).
38. Id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
39. Id. arts. 85-86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28.
40. Id. art. 4, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. The European Union is served by five
main institutions: the European Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the ECJ,
and the Court of Auditors. Id.
41. Id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612 (providing for free movement of workers).
42. Id. arts. 85, 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28 (establishing EC competition
rules).
43. See id. art. 3, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89 (describing European Community
activities).
44. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing common market as means
for achieving EU goals).
45. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
46. Id. art. 8(1), para. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 593 (defining citizenship of Union).
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nity for employment-related purposes.4 7 EC competition law
also contributes to the establishment of the common market, by
promoting an efficient and fair competitive environment.48
1. Establishment of a Common Market
The Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity49 ("ECSC Treaty") initiated a movement towards Euro-
pean unity by providing for specific economic objectives, includ-
ing a Community-wide market for coal and steel.50 The Treaty
Establishing the European Economic Community51 ("EEC
Treaty") continued the movement toward European unification
by providing for the establishment of a common market.52 The
common market requires elimination of obstacles to intra-Com-
munity trade, thereby merging the national markets of the Mem-
ber States into a single internal market 5 having economic condi-
tions similar to those in the market of a single state.54 The 1985
"Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the
Union." Id.
47. See id. art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612 (free movement of workers).
48. See id. art. 85, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27 (prohibiting restrictive trade agree-
ments); id. art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28 (prohibiting abuse of dominant market
positions).
49. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951,
261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter ECSC Treaty], as amended in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNInS (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
50. Id. art. 1, 261 U.N.T.S. at 145. The ECSC Treaty instituted a community
"based on a common market, common objectives, and common institutions." Id.
51. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II) [hereinafter EEC Treaty] in TREA-
TIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
52. Id. art. 1, 298 U.N.T.S. at 15, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 3.
53. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (describing
one common market activity as establishing an internal market characterized by free
movement of goods, persons, services, and capital).
54. Schul v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, Case 15/81, [1982] E.C.R.
1409, 1431-32, [1982] 3 C.M.L.R. 229, 251 (describing common market). "It is impor-
tant that not only commerce as such but also private persons who happen to be con-
ducting an economic transaction across national frontiers should be able to enjoy the
benefits of that market." Id. The EC Treaty expressly identifies the establishment of an
internal market as a principal goal of the common market. EC Treaty, supra note 11,
art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. In the TEU, the Member States stated their deter-
mination to "promote economic and social progress for their peoples[ ) within the con-
text of the accomplishment of the internal market." TEU, supra note 8, pmbl., 19,
OJ. C 224/1, at2 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 726. One of the objectives of the Euro-
pean Union is the promotion of "economic and social progress . .. in particular
through the creation of an area without internal frontiers." Id. art. B, OJ. C 224/1, at 5
(1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727.
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Luxembourg IGC resulted5 5 in the Single European Act
56
("SEA"), a principal goal of which was completion of the inter-
nal market57 by the end of 1992.58 Two 1990 IGC's, held in
Rome, resulted in the signing of the TEU, 59 which, along with
continuing the goal of an area without internal frontiers,6°
changed the name of the EEC Treaty to the EC Treaty.6 1
The TEU represents the latest stage in the process of Euro-
pean Unification.62 Under Community law, the TEU supersedes
national laws of Member States not consistent with its provi-
sions.63 The forum for discussing amendment of the TEU is an
IGC, consisting of representatives of Member State govern-
ments.64 Recognizing the potential for further evolution of the
European Union, the TEU itself requires the holding of an IGC
55. See id. art. N, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739. In order to
amend the founding Treaties "a conference of representatives of the governments of
the Member States... shall be convened.., for the purposes of determining by com-
mon accord the amendments to be made to those Treaties." Id. art. N(1), para. 2, OJ.
C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
56. Single European Act, OJ. L 169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter
SEA] (amending EEC Treaty, supra note 51, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1
(Cmd. 5179-I)).
57. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (discussing internal market).
58. WYATr, supra note 8, at 14.
59. David O'Keeffe, From Maastricht to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference: The
Challenges Facing the Union, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR. INTEGRATION 135, 135-36 (1994).
60. TEU, supra note 8, art. B, 1 1, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
727. Other objectives of the TEU include the establishment of economic and monetary
union, including a single currency; the implementation of a common foreign and se-
curity policy; the introduction of EU citizenship; the development of close co-operation
on justice and home affairs; and the overall maintenance and development of Commu-
nity law. Id.
61. Id. art. G, O.J. C 224/1, at 6 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 729.
62. See id. art. A, 2, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727 ("This
Treaty marks a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the
peoples of Europe .. ").
63. See BERMANN, supra note 12, at 166 ("At a minimum... Member State institu-
tions are bound to act in conformity with the rules and principles laid down by Commu-
nity law."). The EC Treaty represents a series of self-imposed limitations on Member
State sovereignty:
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the
international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limi-
tation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community,
the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited
fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds both their nationals
and themselves.
Costa v. ENEL, Case 6/64, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 594, [1964] C.M.L.R. 425, 455.
64. TEU, supra note 8, art. N, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739.
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in 199665 to discuss proposals for further treaty amendments.66
One of the EC Treaty's primary goals is the establishment of
a common market,67 designed to promote economic develop-
ment and performance,68 high levels of employment and social
protection,6 9 high standards and quality of life,7" economic and
social unity among Member States,7 and sustainable, non-infla-
tionary economic growth.72 The internal market represents a
limited objective within the broad concept of a common market
comprised of several community activities.7" The EC Treaty de-
scribes the internal market as an area in which goods, persons,
services, and capital move freely across Member State bounda-
ries.7" Furthermore, to facilitate the establishment of the com-
mon market, the EC Treaty protects competition from distor-
tion.7" Pursuit of these objectives is indispensable to the achieve-
ment and existence of the common market. 76
65. See id. art. N(2), OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 739. ("A
conference of representatives of the governments of the Member States shall be con-
vened in 1996 to examine those provisions of this Treaty for which revision is provided,
in accordance with the objectives set out in Articles A and B.").
66. Id. The intergovernmental conference ("IGC") is currently scheduled to begin
on March 29, 1996, in Turin. WEBBER, supra note 33, available in LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
67. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588. The establish-
ment of a common market is one of the Community's principal means for achieving its
tasks. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See WYATt, supra note 8, at 357-58 (comparing Article 7a's specific definition of
internal market with Article 2's broad enumeration of tasks to be achieved by establish-
ment of common market).
74. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 7a, 12, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 592 ("The inter-
nal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in which the free move-
ment of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Treaty."); see also supra notes 53, 73 and accompanying text (discussing
internal market).
75. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(g), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 589 ("[T]he activities
of the Community shall include.., a system ensuring that competition in the internal
market is not distorted."); see also WYATt, supra note 8, at 377 (concluding that establish-
ment of common market entails preservation of effective market competition, although
"distortion" implies any deviation from perfect competition).
76. Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission, Case 6/72, [1973]
E.C.R. 215, 244, [1973] C.M.L.R. 199, 223-24 [hereinafter Continental Can]. "[P]ursuit
of the objectives laid down by Article 3 is indispensable for the achievement of the
Community's task." Id.
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2. Article 48: Prohibiting Obstacles to Freedom of Movement
for Workers within the European Union
The four fundamental freedoms77 of the European Union
include:78 the free movement of goods,
79 persons,8 0 services,8 1
and capital.82 In the context of the free movement of persons,
83
Article 4884 specifically protects freedom of movement for work-
ers.8 5 Freedom of movement for workers entails the right to
move between Member States for purposes of seeking, ac-
cepting, and maintaining employment.
86
Discrimination on grounds of nationality is prohibited
77. See, e.g., Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035,
1049 1 3, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 454, 467 (discussing fundamental freedoms).
78. See BERMANN, supra note 12, at 315 (discussing fundamental freedoms).
79. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
80. Id. The EEC Treaty expressly identified freedom of movement for workers
between Member States among the "Foundations of the Community." EEC Treaty,
supra note 51, pt. Two, title III, ch. 1, art. 48, 298 U.N.T.S. at 36. 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No.
1, at 23.
81. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
82. Id.
83. See id. tit. III, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-23 (free movement of persons, services
and capital). The EC Treaty distinguishes between two categories of "persons" with
respect to freedom of movement: workers and self-employed persons. Id. arts. 48-66,
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-18. For the latter, there are two freedoms: the freedom of
establishment, and the freedom to provide services. Id. arts. 52-58, 59-66, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 613-16, 616-18. These freedoms are based on the same principles as free-
dom of movement for workers as far as entry, residence, and treatment are concerned.
State v. Royer, Case 48/75, [1976] E.C.R. 497, 509, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 619, 636.
84. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
85. See id. (providing for free movement of workers).
86. Id. art. 48(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
[Freedom of movement for workers] shall entail the right, subject to limita-
tionsjustified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health: (a)
to accept offers of employment actually made; (b) to move freely within the
territory of Member States for this purpose; (c) to stay in a Member State for
the purpose of employment in accordance with the provisions governing the
employment of nationals of that State laid down by law, regulation or adminis-
trative action; (d) to remain in the territory of a Member State after having
been employed in that State, subject to conditions which shall be embodied in
implementing regulations to be drawn up by the Commission.
Id. A corollary to the right of freedom of movement is the right to remain in the host
country after being employed there, under certain conditions embodied in implement-
ing regulations of the Commission. Id. art. 48(2)(d), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R at 612. Under
Council Regulation No. 1612/68, provisions laid down by Member States which restrict
the number or percentage of foreign nationals in any activity, or at a national level, are
not to apply to Member State nationals. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, art. 4(1), O.J.
L 257/2, at 3 (1968).
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within the EC Treaty's scope of application. 7 Article 48 ex-
pressly extends this prohibition of discrimination to employ-
ment relationships. 88  Consequently, Member State nationals
have the right to be employed in other Member States under the
same terms and conditions as nationals of that state.89
The free movement of workers is intended to contribute to
the goal of establishing a common market by ensuring that la-
bor, one of the main factors of production,9" flows freely be-
tween Member States.9 Conversely, Article 48 does not extend
to situations wholly internal to a Member State,9 2 because such
internal situations do not affect the common market.93 For ex-
ample, a worker is not entitled to the protection of Article 48
unless he exercises, or attempts to exercise, his right to move
freely between Member States.94
Article 48's provisions are subject to limitations justified by
considerations of public policy, public security, or public
health,95 and do not apply to public service employment.96 The
87. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 6, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591. "Within the scope of
application of this Treaty .. .any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be
prohibited." Id.
88. Id. art. 48(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. "[Freedom of movement for workers]
shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers of
the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and other conditions of work
and employment." Id.; see also Don;! v. Mantero, Case 13/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1333, 1339,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 586 (discussing free movement of workers).
89. Don, [1976] E.C.R. at 1339, 1 6, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586. The concepts of
employment and working conditions extend beyond the literal meanings of these
terms, for example, the right of free movement extends to a worker's family. Council
Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 86, OJ. L 257/2, at 2 (1968). The concept of free
movement of workers also includes certain social and political considerations. See
Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 86, art. 7(3), OJ. L 257/2, at 4 (1968)
("[A worker who is a national of a Member State] shall enjoy the same social and tax
advantages as national workers").
90. WYAT, supra note 8, at 237.
91. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612. "Freedom of
movement for workers shall be secured within the Community. . . ." Id.
92. Iorio v. Azienda Autonoma Delle Ferrovie Dello Stato (Italian State Rys.), Case
298/84, [1986] E.C.R. 247, [1986] 3 C.M.L.R. 665; Regina v. Saunders, Case 175/78,
[1979] E.C.R. 1129, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 216.
93. See supra note 53-54 and accompanying text (describing common market as
area characterized by freedom of movement across Member State boundaries).
94. Morson v. Netherlands, Cases 35, 36/82, [1982] E.C.R. 3723, [1983] 2
C.M.L.R. 221. In general, Community law can only be invoked and applied when trans-
frontier activities are concerned. MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 185.
95. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
96. Id. art. 48(4), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
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public policy, security, and health exceptions apply, by their
terms, only to the specific employment rights conferred by Arti-
cle 48(3).9 Accordingly, nationality discrimination, prohibited
by Article 48(2), cannot be justified by resort to the exceptions.9"
3. Articles 85 and 86: Regulating Market Competition
Unimpeded99 economic competition is vital to an effec-
tive,1"' market-based1 ' economic system. 10 2 Most economists103
encourage competition for its ability to allocate resources ac-
cording to consumer choice,10 4 to avoid waste in acquiring mar-
ket power,' 0 5 and to stimulate efficiency in the marketplace, 0 6
thereby promoting opportunities for job creation.1 0 7 Accord-
ingly, EC competition rules, articulated in Articles 85 and 86,108
address activities, both of Member States' 0 9 and of private per-
97. Id. art. 48(3), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
98. Wfirttembergische Milchverwertung-Sfidmilch-AG v. Ugliola, Case 15/69,
[1969] E.C.R. 363, 365, [1970] C.M.L.R. 194, 202.
99. See WvATr, supra note 8, at 377 (arguing that EC Treaty Article 's requirement
of competition free from "distortion" is not realistic, because "the idea of 'distortion'
implies deviation from a state of perfect competition."). "What is needed is the preser-
vation of effective competition .... " Id. Effective competition requires "a level of chal-
lenge from other operators sufficient to make efficiency and innovation a condition of
ultimate survival as a market participant." Id.
100. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing effective competition).
101. VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCrORY GUIDE TO EC COMPETITION LAW AND
PPAcrICE 7 (5th ed. 1994). "Resources in the world are limited, but demand for them is
not. In socialist economies or wartime, resources have been allocated by officials and
rationing. The free market solution is to ration through the market." Id. On the sup-
ply side of the market, firms good at producing goods that people want will flourish and
have more to spend than firms less good at it, thereby encouraging efficient produc-
tion. Id. On the demand side, if cost increases, some consumers may switch to less
expensive substitutes, thereby encouraging competitive pricing. Id.
102. Competition, EUR. UPDATE, June 2, 1994, available in WESTIAW, EURUPDATE
Database; see also WYATr, supra note 8, at 377 ("Competition is an essential aspect of the
market mechanism because the availability of choice between goods and services estab-
lishes a link between the success of an undertaking and its ability to satisfy customers'
wishes.").
103. See KORAH, supra note 101, at 7 ("Most economists welcome the 'invisible
hand' of competition ...
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Competition, supra note 102, § 1.1.
108. EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 85-86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28.
109. Id. art. 90, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 629. "In the case of public undertakings...
Member States shall neither enact nor maintain in force any measure contrary to the
rules contained in ... Articles 85 [and 86]." Id.; see Pigs Marketing Board v. Redmond,
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sons and firms, 110 that are likely to restrict competition within
the European Union. 1 '
Article 85(1) prohibits agreements between undertakings 1 2
and associations of undertakings" 3  that distort competition
within the common market and affect trade between Member
States. 1 4 An agreement falls within the scope of Article 85(1) if
Case 83/78,,[1978] E.C.R. 2347, [1979] 1 C.M.L.R. 177 (applying competition rules to
Member States when they carry out commercial and economic activities).
110. SeeEC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [,1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27 (prohibiting
agreements between undertakings in restriction of competition). EC Treaty provisions
designed to create an area without internal frontiers would be of little value if the gov-
ernmental barriers between Member States, which they prohibit, were simply replaced
by restrictive trade practices and cartels. KoIaH, supra note 101, at 1.
111. EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 85-86, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-28.
112. See WYATT, supra note 8, at 382 ("A rough synonym [for undertaking] would
be a 'business concern.' "); MATHUSEN supra note 8, at 220-21. "Undertaking" is a broad
concept that embraces any entity, private or public, engaged in economic or commer-
cial activities. Id.; see Opinion of Advocate General Roemer, Italy v. Council and Com-
mission, Case 32/65, [1966] E.C.R. 411, 418, [1969] C.M.L.R. 39, 52 ("[U]ndertakings
are natural or legal persons which take part actively and independently in business and
are not therefore engaged in a purely private activity.... ."). Professor RogerJ. Goebel
points out that the term "enterprise" is a more appropriate English translation of the
original text of Article 85 than the term "undertaking". Roger J. Goebel, Lecture at
European Community Law Course, at Fordham University School of Law (Fall 1995).
113. MATHUSEN, supra note 8, at 220. The term "association" is not limited to a
particular form of association. Id.; see Nederlandse Vereniging voor Fruit en
Groentenimporthandel v. Commission, Case 71/74, [1975] E.C.R. 563, 583, [1975] 2
C.M.L.R. 123, 146 (applying Article 85(1) to associations of undertakings).
114. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27. "[A]II
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and con-
certed practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the com-
mon market [shall be prohibited]." Id. art. 85(1), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626. Article
85(1) goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list of clearly prohibited agreements or prac-
tices, including those which "apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions,"
and those which "make the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance ... of
supplementary obligations which ... have no connection with the subject of such con-
tracts." Id. art. 85(1)(d)-(e), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627. This prohibition applies equally
to agreements between competitors ("horizontal" agreements) and agreements be-
tween a manufacturer and its distributor ("vertical" agreements), where more than one
undertaking, or association of undertakings, is involved. Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug,
Case 15/74, [1974] E.C.R 1147, 1167 141, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 480, 506-07. "Article 85
... is not concerned with agreements or concerted practices between.., parent com-
pany and subsidiary [if] the subsidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of
action on the market, and if the agreements or practices are concerned merely with ...
internal allocation of tasks .... " Id. Although Article 85 presupposes the existence of
an agreement or decision, the agreement does not have to be legally binding. See ACF
Chemifarma NV v. Commission, Case 41/69, [1970] E.C.R. 661, [1967-1970 Transfer
Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8083 (applying Article 85 to so-called gen-
tleman's agreement). The category of "concerted practices" catches informal agree-
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it will potentially or actually, directly or indirectly, prevent, re-
strict, or distort competition in the common market115 to an ap-
preciable extent.' 16 Pursuant to Article 85(2), any agreements
or practices prohibited under Article 85 are automatically null
and void.' 7
Just as agreements between undertakings may adversely af-
fect competition and interstate trade, so may abuse of a domi-
nant position" 8 in the marketplace by one or more undertak-
ings. 119 The concept of abuse under Article 86 focuses on the
ments once they have been implemented. KoRtAH, supra note 101, at 40. The precise
scope of the term "agreement," therefore, is not a crucial point. Id.
115. Soci&6t Technique Mini6re v. Maschininbau Ulm GmbH, Case 56/65, [1966]
E.C.R. 235, 251, [1966] C.M.L.R. 357, 377. In this context, an agreement that only
impacts the internal trade of a Member State generally is not covered by Article 85 (1),
unless it leads to market partitioning, for example, by isolating a national market. Societi
Technique Minire, [1966] E.C.R. at 251, [19661 C.M.L.R. at 377. Similarly, Article 85(1)
is not concerned with agreements or practices that interfere with the functioning of the
market in third countries, as long as the consequences are not likely to spill back into
the common market. WYATr, supra note 8, at 384.
116. V61k v. Vervaecke, Case 5/69, [19691 E.C.R. 295, [1969] C.M.L.R. 273. In
other words, the "de minimis" rule applies. See MATHISEN, supra note 8, at 224. Article
85(1) also applies to agreements involving only undertakings situated outside of the
European Union, as long the agreement affects trade between Member States and com-
petition within the common market. Ahlstr6m et al. v. Commission, Joined Cases 89,
104, 114, 116 & 125-29/85, [1988] E.C.R. 5193, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R. 901.
117. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(2), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 617. This "nullity"
provision only applies to agreements and practices that offend Article 85 in the aggre-
gate, meaning those not exempted under Article 85(3). KoRAH, supra note 101, at 66.
According to the ECJ, only those provisions of an agreement contrary to Article 85 are
void. Soci&t6 de Vente de Ciments et B&ons v. Kerpen & Kerpen, Case 319/82. [1983]
E.C.R. 4173, [1985] 1 C.M.L.R. 511.
118. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28. Dominance
refers to a degree of market power that allows an undertaking to operate without taking
into account the activities of its competitors and customers. United Brands v. Commis-
sion, Case 27/76, [1978] E.C.R. 207, 277, [1978] 1 C.M.L.R. 429, 486-87. Article 86
"relates to a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it
to prevent effective competition being maintained in the relevant market by giving it
the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, custom-
ers and ultimately ... consumers." United Brands, [1978] E.C.R. at 277, 65, [1978] 1
C.M.L.R. at 486-87. "In order to determine whether a [market] position is dominant, it
must be viewed in relation to the 'relevant product market' and the 'relevant geograph-
ical market'." MATHJSEN, supra note 8, at 237. At any rate, the United Brands judgment
suggests that a dominant position exists if a firm has over 45 % of the relevant market
and is considerably larger than its competitors. KORAH, supra note 101, at 105. Such a
position allows an undertaking to essentially ignore the competitive pressures of an
efficient marketplace, thus distorting competition. Id. at 69.
119. MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 236. One of the models for Article 86 was section
2 of the U.S. Sherman Antitrust Act, which provides that no person shall "monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
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effect of hindering competition in the marketplace. 12 0 Accord-
ingly, Article 86 prohibits abuse of a dominant position 12 1 within
the common market or a substantial part of it, insofar as such
abuse negatively affects trade between Member States. 122
monopolize ... trade or commerce . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994); see BERtANN, supra
note 12, at 802 (discussing influence of Sherman Act on Article 86).
120. Hoffmann-LaRoche v. Commission, Case 85/76, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 541,
[1979] 3 C.M.L.R. 211, 290-91. If the practice in question has beneficial effects, it
would, not be considered abusive and Article 86 would not apply. Hoffmann-LaRoche,
[1979] E.C.R. at 541, 1 91, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 290-91.
121. See Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1979] E.C.R. at 541, 91, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at 290-
91. The concept of abuse of a dominant position is an objective concept relating to
behavior that influences the structure of the market and has the effect of hindering the
maintenance or growth of existing competition through methods other than those nor-
mally conditioning competition. Id.
122. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 86, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28. "Any abuse by
one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a
substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so
far as it may affect trade between Member States." Id. art. 86, 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at
627. It has been argued that "abuse" is an inadequate translation of the term "abusive
exploitation" used in the authentic texts of the EC Treaty in most languages. KORAH,
supra note 101, at 3. Article 86 goes on to provide a non-exhaustive list, similar to that
contained in Article 85(1), of clear examples of such abuse, including "directly or indi-
rectly imposing unfair ... trading conditions[,]" EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 86(a),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627, "applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with
other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage[,]" id. art.
86(c), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627, and "making the conclusion of contracts subject to
acceptance... of supplementary obligations [not] connect[ed] with the subject of such
contracts." Id. art. 86(d), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28.
In the United States, the approximate equivalent of Articles 85 and 86 is the Sher-
man Antitrust Act of 1890 ("Sherman Act"), which prohibits agreements in restraint of
trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). The Sherman Act also prohibits activities which monopo-
lize or attempt to monopolize a market. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). Every trade agreement
restrains trade, thus falling within the literal prohibition of the Sherman Act. See Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement concerning
trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To bind, to restrain, is of their very es-
sence.") (Brandeis, J.). In response to this literal prohibition of all trade agreements,
U.S. courts developed the rule of reason, which insulates an agreement from the Sher-
man Act if its pro-competitive effects outweigh its anti-competitive effects on the market
as a whole. Richard Whish & Brenda Surfin, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, 7 Y.B. EUR.
L. 1, 5-8 (1987). The rule of reason is applied to decide whether a restraint of trade
falls under the Sherman Act, except in those cases where an agreement is illegal per se.
See Northern Pacific Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (certain types of agree-
ments are conclusively presumed to fall within Sherman Act because of "pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue . . . ."). Examples of per se
violations of the Sherman Act are price fixing agreements.and market-sharing agree-
ments. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (regarding horizon-
tal price fixing agreements); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park and Sons Co., 220
U.S. 373, (1911) (regarding vertical price fixing agreements); U.S. v. Topco Associates,
405 U.S. 596 (1972) (market sharing agreements). In such cases, the plaintiff's burden
of proof is satisfied by merely showing that the agreement existed. Whish, supra, at 7.
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B. EU Institutions Implementing Community Law
The tasks of the European Union, 123 including the objec-
tives of the common market, 12 4 are carried out by five institu-
tions:125 the European Parliament, 126 the Council, 127 the Com-
mission, 128 the ECJ, 129 and the Court of Auditors.13 0 The TEU
empowers each institution to act within the limits of the powers
expressly conferred upon it.131 The Council's functions are leg-
islative in nature.1 32 The Commission performs executive func-
tions,13 and the ECJ functions as the judiciary branch of the Eu-
ropean Union.1 34 The European Parliament represents the in-
terests of Member State populations regarding EU activityl3 5 and
the Court of Auditors audits the EU budget.1
36
1. The Council and Implementation of Article 48
The Council is the primary legislative and decision-making
body of the European Union.13 7 Council responsibilities include
123. See TEU, supra note 8, art. B, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at
727 (EU objectives, including creation of balanced and sustainable economic and social
progress through maintenance of internal market).
124. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing objectives of com-
mon market).
125. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 4, [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. Since the signing
of the Treaty establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European
Communities ("Merger Treaty"), in April 1965, the three European communities have
been served by a single set of institutions, whose powers vary depending upon which
Treaty they act under for any given purpose. WYA-r, supra note 8, at 9.
126. EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 137-44, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676-79.
127. Id. arts. 145-54, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679-82. The Council is also known as
the "Council of Ministers" in order to distinguish it from other "Councils." BERMANN.
supra note 12, at 51.
128. EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 155-63. [19921 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-84.
129. Id. arts. 164-88, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684-91.
130. Id. arts. 188a-c, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691-93.
131. Id. art. 4(1), para. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 590. "Each institution shall act
within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty." Id.
132. See BERMANN, supra note 12, at 51 (indicating that Council "exercises primary
legislative power within the Community").
133. See id. at 57 (stating that Commission is often referred to as "Community's
executive organ").
134. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 174, 1, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 688 ("If [an]
action is well founded, the Court of Justice shall declare the act concerned to be
void.").
135. BERMANN, supra note 12, at 63.
136. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 188a, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 691.
137. MATHJSEN, supra note 8, at 57. "Although the Council has the largest legisla-
tive role in the Community, it operates under highly unusual constraints." BERMANN,
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ensuring that EC Treaty objectives13 8 are attained.139  One way
the Council fulfills its responsibilities is by conferring powers on
the Commission via implementing regulations. 140
In 1968, the Council promulgated Regulation 1612/68 on
the freedom of movement for workers 4 ' to reiterate and expand
upon the provisions of Article 48.14 Regulation 1612/68 estab-
lishes the right to take up an activity as an employed person,143
limited to Member States nationals.1 44 Regulation 1612/68 re-
fers to freedom and dignity4 ' in the worker's exercise of the
fundamental right to freedom of movement.1 46 Article 7 of Reg-
ulation 1612/68 expressly expands upon the EC Treaty's prohi-
bition of nationality discrimination. 147 Article 7 provides for the
rights of migrant workers who are Member State nationals to be!
treated the same as host-state nationals regarding social and tax
advantages, 48 access to vocational training,'49 and collective or
supra note 12, at 51. The Council is made up of ministers representing each Member
State, with the Presidency held in turn by each Member State for a six month term. EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 146, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680.
138. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text (discussing EC Treaty objectives
including common market).
139. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 679.
140. Id. art. 145, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 680. The procedure by which the Council
confers power on the Commission "must be consonant with principles and rules to be
laid down in advance by the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Com-
mission and after obtaining the Opinion of the European Parliament." Id.
141. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 86, OJ. L 257/2 (1968).
142. WYATT, supra note 8, at 254; see also supra notes 84-98 and accompanying text
(discussing EC Treaty Article 48 on free movement of workers).
143. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 86, art. 1(1), O.J. L 257/2, at 2
(1968).
144. Id. The Court has found that the distinction between "workers" and "self-
employed persons" is not crucial because the freedom of movement, the freedom of
establishment, and the freedom to provide services, are all based on the same principles
and, therefore, merit uniform application. See Walrave v. Union Cyclists Internationale,
Case 36/74, [1974] E.C.R. 1405, 1419, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320, 333 (concluding that
distinction between activities referred to in Articles 48 and 59 "cannot justify a more
restrictive interpretation of the scope of the freedom to be ensured").
145. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 86, pmbl. 9, O.J. L 257/2, at 2
(1968).
146. Id. pmbl. 8, OJ. L 257/2, at 2 (1968).
147. Id. art. 7, OJ. L 257/2, at 4 (1968); see supra notes 87-89 and accompanying
text (discussing EC Treaty Articles 6 and 48, which prohibit nationality-based discrimi-
nation).
148. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 86, art. 7(2), O.J. L 257/2, at 4
(1968).'
149. Id. art. 7(3), O.J. L 257/2, at 4 (1968).
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individual agreements on employment conditions.15 0 Recogniz-
ing that a worker's ability to have his family live with him pro-
motes mobility of labor,15 1 the Council also provided for the pro-
tection of the migrant worker's family from nationality discrimi-
nation. 152
2. The Commission and Exemptions Under Article 85
The responsibilities of the Commission include providing
for the proper functioning and development of the common
market.'5 5  The Commission operates as the European Union's
chief executive body,154 performing tasks commonly identified
as executive in nature,155 such as enforcing Community law.'5 6
In contrast to the Council, whose members directly represent
the interests of their governments, the Commission represents
the interests of the European Union as a whole. 57 It is the Com-
mission's task to ensure that EU interests prevail when action is
taken by Member States, by the Council, or by natural or legal
persons. 158
The EC Treaty authorizes the Commission to implement
competition policy in the European Union.1 59 Council Regula-
150. Id. art. 7(4), OJ. L 257/2, at 4 (1968).
151. BERMANN, supra note 12, at 469.
152. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 86, art. 10-12, O.J. L 257/2, at 5
(1968).
153. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
154. WYA-Ir, supra note 8, at 29. According to Wyatt. describing the Commission as
an executive body is misleading because EC Treaty Article 4(1) makes it clear that the
Commission's powers of implementation are limited to those directly conferred by the
Treaty or the acts of the Council. Id.
155. BERMANN, supra note, 12, at 57.
156. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 155, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682; see id. art. 169,
[1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686 (stating that Commission may bring Member States before
ECJ for failing to fulfill treaty obligations).
157. MATHnJSEN, supra note 8, at 67
158. Id. The twenty Commission members must all be nationals of Member States
and they must be completely independent of outside influence in the performance of
their duties. EC Treaty, supra note 11, arts. 157(1)-(2), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682-83.
The Council, acting unanimously, may alter the number of members of the Commis-
sion. Id. art. 157(1), para. 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682. This power might be exercised,
for example, to accommodate newly admitted Member States, in order to satisfy the
requirement that the Commission -include at least one, but not more than two, nation-
als of each member state. Id. art. 157(1), para. 4, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
159. See id. art. 87, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627. Under Article 87, the Council has the
duty and power to give effect to the principles of Articles 85 and 86 and to create means
of enforcing those principles, through regulations or directives. Id. "The EC competi-
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tion 17/62160 empowers the Commission to impose fines for vio-
lation of the competition rules.'61 The Commission has the ex-
clusive authority to grant block exemptions' 62 and, in certain cir-
cumstances, individual exemptions from EC competition
rules. 16
3
Acknowledging that some forms of economic collaboration
are beneficial,"c Article 85 includes mechanisms to exempt cer-
tain agreements from the rules even though they restrict compe-
tition. 16' The Commission's power to grant such exemptions is
final, subject only to review by the Court of Justice. 166 Pursuant
to authority granted by the Council,' 6 7 the Commission has
adopted regulations providing for automatic exemption of cer-
tain agreements or practices from Article 85(1).168 In the ab-
tion rules and the way in which they are implemented by the Commission are.., of
utmost importance to all companies operating in Europe." Competition, supra note 102,
§ 1.1.
160. Council Regulation No. 17/62, 13J.O. 204 (1962), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed. 1959-
62, at 87. The Commission has wide discretion as to what its base for computing fines
will be. KORAH, supra note 101, at 127-28.
161. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 160, arts. 15-16, O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 91-92.
162. MATHUSEN, supra note 8, at 227-28.
163. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 160, art. 9(1), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 89.
164. KoRAH, supra note 101, at 63.
165. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(3), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
The provisions of [Article 85(1)] may... be declared inapplicable in the case
of [any agreement, decision, or practice] which contributes to improving the
production or distribution of goods or to promoting technical or economic
progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of the resulting benefit, and
which does not: (a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which
are not indispensable to the attainment of these objectives; (b) afford such
undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substan-
tial part of the products in question.
Id. The aim of the competition rules is what the ECJ described as "workable competi-
tion." Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, [1977] E.C.R. 1875, 1904, [1978] 2 C.M.L.R.
1, 33-34.
166. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 160, art. 9(1), OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 89. In this regard, the jurisdiction of national courts is limited to determin-
ing whether an agreement or practice is in accordance with Article 85(1) and to declar-
ing it void, if appropriate, under Article 85(2). L'Oreal v. DeNeuwe AMCK, [1980]
E.C.R. 3775, 3790, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 235, 252.
167. MATHIUSEN, supra note 8, at 227-28. The Council decides by regulation on the
principle of the exemption and delegates the task of working out the details to the
Commission. Id.; see Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O. 533 (1965), OJ. Eng. Spec.
Ed. 1965-66, at 35 (providing for application of Article 85(3) to certain categories of
agreements and concerted practices).
168. See, e.g., Commission Regulation No. 1983/83, OJ. L 173/1 (1983); Commis-
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sence of qualifying for one of these block exemptions, an agree-
ment may be granted an individual exemption'69 under Article
85(3),170 provided that the Commission is first notified of the
agreement. 171
If all of the conditions for exemption from Article 85 are
satisfied, 172 the Commission may decide to grant an individual
exemption, although it is under no obligation to do so.' 73
Rather than grant an individual exemption, often the Commis-
sion sends a comfort letter 174 informing the parties that further
Commission action is not warranted and that the Commission is
closing the file. 175 Alternatively, upon proper application, the
Commission may issue a negative clearance, 176 certifying that
there are no grounds under the competition rules for Commis-
sion action as to a particular agreement, decision, or practice. 77
sion Regulation No. 1984/83, O.J. L 173/5 (1983); Commission Regulation No. 417/
85, O.J. L 53/1 (1985) (discussing exclusive distribution agreements, exclusive purchas-
ing agreements, and specialization agreements).
169. MATHUSEN, supra note 8, at 226.
170. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(3), [19911 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
171. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 160. art. 4(1), O.J. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-1962, at 88. "Until they have been notified, no decision in application of article
85(3) may be taken." Id. Notification provides protection from fines from the date of
notification until the Commission rules on it. KoRHj, supra note 101, at 128. It is also
possible that abuse of the notification procedure to delay sanctions against blatantly
illegal agreements may be considered grounds to impose fines despite notification. Id.
at 143.
172. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (quoting and discussing Article
85(3)). Application of the Article 85(3) conditions is essentially a technical analysis of
whether the agreement, decision, or practice is more beneficial to competition than it
is harmful. See KoRAH, supra note 101, at 63 ("The prohibition in article 85(1) may be
declared inapplicable to any agreements or category of agreements provided that they
have certain characteristics . . . ."). The counterpart to Article 85(3) in U.S. antitrust
law is the rule of reason. WYATr, supra note 8, at 404-05; see also supra note 122 (discuss-
ing rule of reason in U.S. antitrust law).
173. See KoRA, supra note 101, at 37 ("[T]he Commission [does not have] the
resources to grant many individual exemptions ad granted only 16 in the four years
from 1990-1993.").
174. Id. at 115. Comfort letters emanate from top officials, and are not binding on
the Commission. MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 243. Undertakings commonly ask for
such letters, as they entail less delay than a formal decision and are likely to influence
national courts. Id. at 243-44.
175. See KoRAH, supra note 101, at 115.
176. Council Regulation No. 17/62, supra note 160, art. 2, OJ. Eng. Spec. Ed.
1959-62, at 88.
177. See id. The negative clearance procedure applies to Articles 85 and 86. Id.
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3. The Court of Justice and the Common Market
The ECJ contributes to the common market by ensuring
that EU and Member State activities, including the interpreta-
tion and application of treaty provisions, comport with provi-
sions of law.' 78 The fifteen-judge ECJ179 entertains legal actions
against Community institutions18 0  and against the Member
States181 for alleged non-observance of Community law. 82 Fur-
thermore, the ECJ hasjurisdiction to answer requests from Mem-
ber State national courts for preliminary rulings181 on the inter-
pretation of treaty provisions and the validity of acts of EU insti-
tutions. 1 4 ECJ decisions shape Community law on specific treaty
178. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 164, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684.
179. Council Decision of 1 January 1995, art. 10(1), OJ. L 1/1, at 4 (1995). The
judges are chosen from qualified persons whose independence is "beyond doubt" and
appointed by common accord of the Governments of the Member States for six year
terms. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 167, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685.
180. Id. arts. 173, 175, 178, 184, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 687-88, 689, 690.
181. Id. arts. 169, 170, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686-87.
182. BERMANN, supra note 12, at 69. The ECJ is assisted in its duties by nine Advo-
cates General, chosen and appointed according to the same standards and procedures
as the judges. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 166, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685; see supra
note 179 (discussing criteria for appointment to ECJ). The Advocate General is not a
judge, but his role is judicial in nature. WYATT, supra note 8, at 106. It is the Advocate
General's duty to present reasoned submissions in cases brought before the ECJ. EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 166, 1 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 685. The Advocate General
functions by conducting an independent examination of the case and recommending a
decision to the ECJ, based on the case file and the reporting judge's report, and setting
forth an analysis of the relevant facts and law in light of the evolving pattern of ECJ case
law in the form of a formal Opinion. WYATT, supra note 8, at 106-07. Although the ECJ
is not bound to follow the Advocate General's Opinion, ECJ decisions often follow the
Advocate General's rationale. Id. at 106. "[I]t is an important safeguard that, even
where the Court ofJustice sits as a court of first and last resort, its decisions are in effect
judicially considered twice over." Id.
To further assist the ECJ with its growing docket and to reduce delays in the adjudi-
cation of cases, the Council established the court of First Instance ("CF"). See EC
Treaty, supra note 11, art. 168a(2), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686 (authorizing Council to
establish Court of First Instance, by unanimous vote). All EC Treaty provisions relating
to the ECJ are applicable to the CH as well, unless the Council decides to the contrary,
and except that the CH is not competent to hear questions referred for a preliminary
ruling. Id. The CH provides relief to the court ofJustice by assuming primary jurisdic-
tion over certain categories of cases. Id. art. 168(a) (1), (2), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686.
CH decisions are subject to a right of appeal to the ECJ on points of law. Id. art.
168a(1), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 686. If the appeal succeeds, the ECJ may quash the deci-
sion and either issue its own final judgment or remand the case to the CFI. WYATT,
supra note 8, at 175.
183. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 177, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689.
184. Id.
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provisions and also give rise to general principles of law. 85
a. Preliminary Rulings on Community Law in Response to
Requests from National Courts
Any court or tribunal of a Member State may refer a ques-
tion to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling'86 if it considers resolu-
tion of the question necessaryr ay to a judgment in its case."'
The primary purpose of the preliminary rulings procedure is to
ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of Com-
munity law."8 9 In addition, this procedure provides private par-
ties with access to the ECJ, when they otherwise lack standing to
seek ECJ relief. 9 °
b. Interpretation of EC Treaty Provisions in Accordance With
Promotion of the Common Market
According to the ECJ, in order to avoid frustration of the
free movement of workers, the terms "worker"'9 1 and "activity as
an employed person"'92 must be given uniform meaning
throughout the European Union.1 93 In other words, these terms
185. See Handelsgesellschaft v. Eihfuhr-und Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Fut-
termittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 1134. [19721 C.M.L.R. 255, 283. "[Rlespect
for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected
by the Court ofJustice." Handelsgesellschaft, [1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at
283.
186. See WYATT, supra note 8, at 142-43 (describing rulings as preliminary in that
they constitute steps in proceedings of referring national courts, which must then apply
preliminary ruling to cases before them).
187. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 177, 1 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 689. Where such
a question arises before a court or tribunal of last resort in a Member State, that court
or tribunal is required to request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ. Id.
188. Id. The ECJ is without jurisdiction to issue a preliminary ruling once the
proceedings before the referring court are terminated. Pardini v. Ministero del com-
mercio con I'estero, Case 338/85, [1988] E.C.R. 2041, 2075, [1991 Transfer Binder] 1
C.E.C. (CCH) 190.
189. RheinmOhlen v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle Getreide, Case 166/73, [1974]
E.C.R. 33, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 255.
190. See International Fruit Co. v. Produkschap voor Groenten en Fruit, Cases 21-
24/72, [1972] E.C.R. 1219, 1226 6, [1975] 2 C.M.L.R. 1, 20 ("Since [the competence
of the Court] extends to all reasons for invalidity capable of marring these acts, the
Court is obliged to examine whether their validity could be affected by their being at
variance with a rule of international law.").
191. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
192. Council Regulation 1612/68, supra note 86, art. 1(1), O.J. L 257/2, at 2
(1968).
193. Levin v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, 1049,
[1982] 2 C.M.L.R. 454, 467.
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have Community meaning 94 and may not be defined by refer-
ence to Member State national law. 95 These terms define the
scope of a fundamental freedom 96 and, therefore, the ECJ inter-
prets them broadly, 197 according to their ordinary meanings and
in light of EC Treaty objectives.1 98 In contrast, because Article
48's exceptions199 impose limitations on the fundamental free-
dom of movement for workers, the ECJ interprets these excep-.
tions narrowly. 0°
194. Levin, [1982] E.C.R. at 1049, 11, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 467. Certain terms
are given Community meaning in order to preserve their uniform application through-
out the Community. Id. For example, if the terms "worker" and "activity as an em-
ployed person" did not have Community meaning-
[T] he Community rules on freedom of movement for workers would be frus-
trated, as the meaning of those terms could be fixed and modified unilater-
ally, without any control by the Community institutions, by national laws which
would this be able to exclude at will certain categories of person from the
benefit of the Treaty.
Id.
195. Id.
196. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental free-
doms, and free movement of workers in that context).
197. Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wfirttemberg, Case 66/85, [1986] E.C.R. 2121,
2144, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 389, 414.
198. Levin, [1982] E.C.R. at 1048, 9, [1982] 2 C.M.L.R. at 467. The ECJ has
interpreted the term "worker" on several occasions. See, e.g., Bettray v. Staatssecretaris
van Justitie, Case 344/87, [1989] E.C.R. 1621, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 459 (guaranteeing
freedom of movement only for persons in pursuit of effective and genuine economic
activities); see also Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost, Case 152/73, [1974] E.C.R. 153,
[ 1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8257 (applying freedom of move-
ment provisions to persons pursuing part-time work and earning below minimum
wage). A person is a worker for purposes of Article 48 if the essential features of an
employment relationship are present: performance of services for a certain period of
time in return for remuneration, under the direction of another. Lawrie-Blum, [1986]
E.C.R. at 2144, 17, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. at 414.
199. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing exceptions to Article
48).
200. See, e.g., Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219,
1231, [1976] 1 C.M.L.R. 140, 155 (interpreting Article 48(3) narrowly); Sotgiu, [1974]
E.C.R. 153, [1974 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8257 (interpreting
Article 48(4) narrowly). Measures taken by a Member State pursuant to the exception
in Article 48(3) regarding refusal of entry, or expulsion, must be based on the personal
conduct of the worker, who must be afforded the same remedies available to nationals.
WYATr, supra note 8, at 266-67; see, e.g., van Duyn v. Home Office, Case 41/74, [1974]
E.C.R. 1337, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 1 (regarding refusal of entry); Romano v. Institut Na-
tional d'Assurance Maladie-Invalidit6, Case 98/80, [1981] E.C.R. 1241, [1983] 2
C.M.L.R. 698 (regarding expulsion). In Commission v. Belgium, the ECJ held that the
public service exception only applies to positions "designed to safeguard the general
interests of the State," which presume "the existence of a special relationship of alle-
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The ECJ contributes to the maintenance of effective 20 1 com-
petition 212 in the internal market" 3 by interpreting Articles 85204
and 86205 broadly, in order to promote competition.20 6 In ac-
cordance with the case-specific effects of restraints on competi-
tion, 21 7 the EC has given expansive meaning to the terms "un-
dertaking" and "associations of undertakings."2 0 8 The Court has
also found that "abuse of a dominant position" is a flexible con-
cept, 2 09 focusing on the overall effects of a practice on competi-
tion in the common market.21
0
c. A New Legal Order and General Principles of Law
The ECJ has found implicit in the EC Treaty a new legal
order 21 1 that transcends traditional international law2 12 and op-
erates for the benefit of Member State nationals as individuals,
as well as for the benefit of signatory states.213 According to this
principle, known as the doctrine of direct effects, 2 14 certain pro-
giance to the State." Case 149/79, [1980] E.C.R. 3881, 3900, [1981] 2 C.M.L.R. 413,
439.
201. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (discussing effective competition).
202. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text (discussing market-based eco-
nomic systems).
203. See supra notes 53, 74 and accompanying text (discussing internal market).
204. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27 (stating that
agreements between undertakings, in restriction of competition, are incompatible with
common market).
205. Id. art. 86, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28 (stating that abuses of dominant posi-
tions by undertakings are incompatible with common market).
206. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing rules on competition in
terms of preventing distortion of competition in common market).
207. See supra note 122 and accompanying text (discussing that all trade agree-
ments, by nature, restrain competition).
208. See supra note 112-13 and accompanying text (discussing "undertaking" and
.associations of undertakings" as broad concepts).
209. See, e.g., Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1979] E.C.R. 461, 541 1 91, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R.
211, 290-91 (finding that abuse is a flexible concept); see also supra note 118 and accom-
panying text (discussing concept of dominant market position).
210. See, e.g., Hoffmann-LaRoche, [1979] E.C.R. at 541, 91, [1979] 3 C.M.L.R. at
290-91 (focusing concept of abuse on overall effects of practices on market).
211. van Gend en Loos v. Neederlandse Tarief Commissie, Case 26/62, [1963]
E.C.R. 1, [1963] C.M.L.R. 105.
212. See AIDAN O'NEILL, DECISIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OFJUSTICE AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS 12 (1994). Under a traditional "dualist theory" of inter-
national law, international agreements do not affect the internal legal order of a signa-
tory state until and unless specifically implemented into national law. Id.
213. van Gend en Loas, [1963] E.C.R. at 12, [1963] 3 C.M.L.R. at 129.
214. Id. at 13, [1963] 3 C.M.L.R. at 130 ("The very nature of [Article 12] makes it
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visions of Community law create individual rights, enforceable
before national courts by Member State nationals.215 Further-
more, Community law, being a distinct legal order,21 6 is in-
dependent of national law2 17 and, therefore, the enforcement of
EC laws having direct effect does not require supporting na-
tional legislation. 1 Article 48, which imposes clear and precise
obligations on Member States and does not require subsequent
implementation, has vertical direct effect219 and may be invoked
by individuals against Member States or institutions.22 °
Apart from treaty provisions221 and the various implement-
ideally adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between Member
states and their subjects.").
215. Id. at 12, [1963] 3 C.M.L.R. at 129. The ECJ's jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings under Article 177, "the object of which is to secure uniform interpretation of
the Treaty by national courts and tribunals, confirms that the states have acknowledged
that Community law has an authority which can be invoked by their nationals before
those courts and tribunals." Id.; see also supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing preliminary rulings).
216. See supra notes 211-13 and accompanying text (discussing new legal order of
Community law).
217. MATHIJSEN, supra note 8, at 149.
218. van Gend en Loos, [1963] E.C.R. at 12, [1963) 3 C.M.L.R. at 129; see O'NEILL,
supra note 212, at 13. The doctrine of "direct applicability" should be distinguished
from the doctrine of direct effects. WYATT, supra note 8, at 53. Direct effects refers to
the aspect of a Community provision that directly confers rights and imposes obliga-
tions without the need for specific legislative incorporation into a particular national
legal order. Id. Direct applicability refers to the legal autonomy of Community law
with regard to national law, i.e., once enacted as Community law, a provision also be-
comes part of the national legal order of Member States. MATHUSEN, supra note 8, at
150-51.
219. See BERMANN, supra note 12, at 180. The term "direct effect" refers to the
"vertical" relationship that exists between governments and their subjects. Id.
220. See Commission v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
83 (finding direct effect of Article 48); Reyners v. Belgium, Case C-2/74 [1974] E.C.R.
631, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R. 305 (discussing direct effect of Article 52); see also Opinion of
Advocate General Mayras, van Duyn, [1974] E.C.R. at 1354, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 8
(discussing direct effect of Article 48). A corollary to this conclusion is the concept of
horizontal direct effect, as between private rather than public establishments or individ-
uals. See BERMANN, supra note 12. at 180. Horizontal direct effect refers to direct effect
in relations between private parties. Id. The ECJ has found horizontal direct effect for
only a few EC Treaty provisions, including Articles 85 and 86. Id.; see Defrenne v. So-
ci&6t Anonyme Belge de Navigation A6rienne Sabena, Case 43/75, [1976] 1 E.C.R. 455,
476, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 98, 125 (holding that Article 119's mandatory prohibition on
discrimination between men and women "extends to all agreements ... intended to
regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals").
221. See WyA-rr, supra note 8, at 148 (stating that treaty provisions constitute pri-
mary Community law).
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ing acts and measures of the institutions, 22 certain general prin-
ciples 22 1 of law are discernible in the ECJ's case law.2 24 Derived
from provisions of national law common to all Member States,
these general principles supersede secondary Community law2 2
6
and are often of sweeping application.22 7 General principles of
Community law recognized by the ECJ include the principle of
proportionality,2 28 the principle of equal treatment,2 2 9 and the
principle of legal certainty.2 30
The general principle of proportionality provides that legiti-
mate objectives may not be accomplished through excessive
means.231 According to the ECJ, limitations on the free move-
ment of persons2 32 are permissible only to the extent that they
are necessary for the public interest.233 Initially, an appropriate
relationship between the means used and the end sought must
exist.23 4 Stated differently, the means must be capable of achiev-
ing the proposed goal. 33 When a choice exists between several
measures to achieve a legitimate goal, the measure least restric-
tive23 6 of individual freedom is the only permissible alterna-
222. See id. (discussing that implementing acts and measures of institutions consti-
tute secondary Community law).
223. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (discussing general principles of
law).
224. WYATr, supra note 8, at 88.
225. Id.
226. See e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case 102/79, [1980] E.C.R. 1473, 1484-85,
[1981] 1 C.M.L.R. 282, 292 (finding that Member States are bound to implement direc-
tives in accordance with general principle of legal certainty).
227. BERMANN, supra note 12, at 128-29.
228. See O'NEILL, supra note 212, at 56. "Although finding its original source in
German law, the proportionality test has been independently developed by the Euro-
pean Court in the course of its own case law." Id.
229. See Royal Scholten-Honig (Holdings) Ltd. v. Intervention Bd. for Agricultural
Produce,Joined Cases 103, 145/77, [1978) E.C.R. 2037, [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 675 (discuss-
ing general principle of equality as fundamental principal of Community law).
230. Administration des Douanes v. Socit6 anonyme Gondrand Frres, Case 169/
80, [1981] E.C.R. 1931, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 1
8769.
231. O'NEILL, supra note 212, at 55.
232. See supra note 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of move-
ment for workers as part of broader concept of freedom of movement for persons).
233. Thieffry v. Conseil de l'ordre des avocats i la Cour de Paris, Case 71/76,
[1977] E.C.R. 765, 776, 777, [1977] 2 C.M.L.R. 373, 403.
234. O'NEILL, supra note 212, at 57.
235. Id.
236. See, e.g., Commission v. Germany, Case 205/84, [1986] E.C.R. 3755, 3803,
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tive.2 s7 Finally, the means employed must be proportionate; the
disadvantages caused, such as restriction of a fundamental free-
dom, 23 8 must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.23 9
The principle of equal treatment provides a basis for judi-
cial review of Community action in any area. 24' This general
principle of law prohibits treating similar situations differently,
unless different treatment is objectively justified.24' Further-
more, the principle of equal treatment prohibits treatment of
different situations in identical manners. 42
In addition, the ECJ developed the principle of legal cer-
tainty, which requires the effect of a provision of law to be clear
and predictable. 43 Generally, the ECJ considers that its rulings
on Community law merely clarify the proper interpretation of a
rule of law that already existed, as opposed to creating new and
distinct rules of law.2 ' Accordingly, ECJ rulings relate back to
the inception of the rule of law in the Community legal order. 43
Occasionally, the Court limits the temporal effects of its judg-
ments to preclude retroactive effect, based on the principle of
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 69, 102 (requiring least onerous means in cases of conflict with indi-
vidual's freedom of action).
237. Queen v. Ex parte Fedesa and Others, Case C-331/88, [1990] I E.C.R. 4023,
4063, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. 507, 532; see also O'NEILL, supra note 212, at 57 (discussing
Fedesa).
238. See supra note 77, 80 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental free-
doms, including free movement of persons).
239. Fedesa, [1990] I E.C.R. at 4063, 13, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 532.
240. WyArr, supra note 8, at 96.
241. Ruckdeschel v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-St. Annen ("Quellmehl"), Joined
Cases 117/76 & 16/77, [1977] E.C.R. 1753, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 445 (invalidating Coun-
cil action abolishing production refunds on maize used for quellmehl and gritz produc-
tion, while continuing to pay refunds on maize used to make starch, as unjustified dis-
criminatory action).
242. See, e.g., Bela-Mfihle Josef Bergmann KG v. Grows-Farm GmbH, Case 114/76,
[1977] E.C.R. 1211, [1979] 2 C.M.L.R. 83 (finding that imposition of financial burden
on agricultural producers was not justified by goal of counteracting chronic imbalance
in milk market, where burden resulted in much higher costs for producers not involved
in milk production industry).
243. Douanes, [1981] E.C.R. 1931, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 8769.
244. See Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Denkavit Italiana, Case 61/
79, [1980] E.C.R. 1205, 1223, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. 694, 707 ("The interpretation which
... the Court of Justice gives to a rule of Community law clarifies and defines where
necessary the meaning and scope of that rule as it ought to have been understood and
applied from the time of its coming into force.").
245. Denkavit Italiana, [1980] E.C.R. at 1223, 17, [1981] 3 C.M.L.R. at 707-08.
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legal certainty. 246 This limitation reflects the rationale that
before persons can conduct themselves in accordance with the
law, the scope of the law must be discernible.247
4. The European Parliament and The Court of Auditors
The primary role of the European Parliament is to express
the political sentiments of the Member State populations with
regard to EU and Member State activity.248 The European Par-
liament consists of representatives of Member State popula-
tions,249 elected by direct universal suffrage.25 ° Under the con-
sultation procedure,251 before the Council makes a final deci-
sion regarding certain areas of Community law,252 the European
Parliament must be consulted.253 Consultation with the Euro-
pean Parliament is required before the Council may issue an
opinion in favor of convening an IGC. 54
The Court of Auditors assists the European Parliament and
246. Defrenne, [1976] I E.C.R. at 481, 74-75, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 128; Blaizot v.
University of Liege, Case 24/86, [1988] E.C.R. 379, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 57.
247. See Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, Case 98/78 [1979] E.C.R. 69, 84, [1979-82
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8541, at 7760 ("A fundamental princi-
ple in the Community legal order requires that a measure adopted by the public au-
thorities shall not be applicable to those concerned before they have the opportunity to
make themselves acquainted with it."). In Defrenne, the Court found that the plaintiff,
an airline hostess, was entitled to pay parity with male cabin staff pursuant to the direct
effect of the principle of equal pay for men and women in EC Treaty Article 119,
[1976] 1 E.C.R. at 476, 40, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 125. Although Ms. Defrenne could
claim back pay, the court avoided opening the floodgates to litigation by denying the
judgment retroactive effect based on considerations of legal certainty because, in such
circumstances, "important considerations of legal certainty affecting all the interests
involved, both public and private, make it impossible in principle to reopen the ques-
tion as regards the past." Id. at 481, 74-75, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 128.
248. BERMANN, supra note 12, at 63.
249. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 137. [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676.
250. Id. art. 138(1), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 676.
251. See WvA'rr, supra note 8, at 37 (discussing the consultation procedure).
252. Id. "[T]he consultation procedure [is] used ... for legislation in several im-
portant policy areas, including the common agricultural policy, harmonization of indi-
rect taxation[,] certain aspects of the protection of the environment[, and] matters on
which a specific legal basis is to be created for the first time . . . ." Id.
253. Id. Generally, the TEU provides that the European Parliament should be
consulted regarding most important matters prior to Council action on Commission
proposals. See MATHJSEN, supra note 8, at 29 n.30 (citing 33 treaty provisions requiring
such consultation).
254. TEU, supra note 8, art. N(1), 1 2, OJ. C 224/1, at 99 (1992), [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 739; see supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing IGCs). Where
a treaty provision specifically provides for consultation of the European Parliament,
that requirement must be strictly complied with. WYATT, supra note 8, at 37.
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the Council in the implementation of the budget.255 The Court
of Auditors examines EU revenue and expenditure accounts
256
to assure the reliability of the accounts and the legality of the
251underlying transactions. In addition, the Court of Auditors
examines whether financial management of EU income and ex-
penditures has been sound2 1' and publishes an annual report on
the results of its audit.25 9
C. Freedom of Movement and Competition Law in the Context of
Labor Relations in Sports
In the European Union, where the relative bargaining
strength of players and player unions under the transfer system
is restricted,2 60 players must resort to their national court systems
to resolve disputes with management.26 1 The ECJ has found that
EC Treaty provisions on freedom of movement for workers
262
apply to rules of sporting associations in certain circum-
stances.263 Comparatively, in the United States two competing
interests shape laws concerning player movement:264 antitrust re-
straint of trade2 65 and collective bargaining by unions.
26
255. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 188c(4), para. 4, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693. The
Court of Auditor's annual report, and the replies of the institutions under audit to its
observations, are essential elements in implementation of the EU budget by the Com-
mission. WYvAr, supra note 8, at 20.
256. MATHISEN, supra note 8, at 115.
257. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 188c(1), para. 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 692.
258. Id. art. 188c(2), para. 1, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 692.
259. Id. art. 188c(4), para. 1, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693.
260. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing transfer system, which
requires clubs to pay transfer fees to player's old club before contracting with that
player).
261. Katz, supra note 1, at 416.
262. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
263. See Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/64, [1974] E.C.R. 1405,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320 (applying Article 48 to professional cycling); Doni v. Mantero,
Case 13/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1333, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578 (applying Article 48 to profes-
sional football).
264. Katz, supra note 1, at 415.
265. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Under the Sherman
Act, all agreements in restraint of trade are illegal. Id. A judicial counterpart to the
Sherman Act is the "Rule of Reason," according to which an agreement does not violate
the Sherman Act if its pro-competitive effects outweigh its anti-competitive effects. Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. U.S., 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
266. See, e.g., Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976)
(discussing non-statutory labor exemption for collective bargaining agreements), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 801, (1977). In the United States, a non-statutory exemption protects
an agreement or practice from antitrust laws where it concerns a mandatory subject of
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1. The Organization of Professional Football in the
European Union
Organized football in the European Union is played by
clubs joined together in national associations. 67 Each national
association,268 including Belgium's ASBL Union Royale Belge des
Sociitts de Football Association269 ("URBSFA"), belongs to the Fidgr-
ation Internationale de Football Association 7° ("FIFA"), which or-
ganizes football internationally from its headquarters in Switzer-
land.2 7  FIFA is further divided into confederations for each
continent, such as the Union of European Football Associa-
tions272 ("UEFA"), which is comprised of European national as-
sociations, including those from Member States.273 Football
matches are played within national associations by clubs belong-
ing to that association or an affiliate. 74 Every professional
player must be registered with his national association in order
to play for a club.275
The URBSFA rules define a transfer as the transaction by
which a player affiliated with an association obtains a change of
bona-fide arm's length collective bargaining,. primarily affecting only parties to the
agreement, and where the particular circumstances of the case require federal labor
policy to prevail over federal antitrust policy. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
267. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Union Royale Beige des Socift6s de Foot-
ball Ass'n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93, slip op. at 4, 4 (Eur. Ct.J. Sept. 20, 1995) (Court
decision not yet reported). One national association exists in each Member State, ex-
cept the United Kingdom where, for historical reasons, there are four. See Katz, supra
note 1, at 397-400 (discussing evolution of professional British football).
268. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman. slip op. at 4, 3. National
associations are further divided into secondary associations responsible for organizing
football in certain sectors or regions. Id.
269. Id. at 4, 1 4. Union Royale Belge des Sociits de Football Association ("URBSFA") is
the association that organizes football on the national level in Belgium. Id.
270. Id. at 4, 5. National associations, such as URBSFA are joined together
worldwide in Fidiration Internationale de Football Association ("FIFA"). Id. Within FIFA,
there are several groupings made up of the national associations of each continent. Id.
271. Id. at 4-5, 5.
272. Id. UEFA is comprised of the national associations of Europe, including as-
sociations from the 18 Member States. Id. UEFA currently has approximately 50 mem-
bers. Id. UEFA organizes the European Championship for national teams and the Eu-
ropean Champions Cup, the European Cup-Winner'sCup and UEFA Cup for club
teams. Id. at 5, 5.
273. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 4, 1 4.
274. Union Royale Beige des Soci6t6s de Football Ass'n v. Bosman, Case C-415/93,
slip op. at 4, 5 (Eur. Ct. J. Dec. 15, 1995) (not yet reported).
275. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 4-5, 5.
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club affiliation.276 Under those rules, clubs are required to offer
professional players new contracts at least sixty-five days before
the end of their current contract,277 failing which the player is
designated an amateur and thereby falls under a different set of
transfer rules.278 If the player rejects his club's offer, he is put on
a list of players available during the month of May for "compul-
sory transfers"2 79 without the consent of his affiliate club 2 ° and
subject to payment of a compensation fee to that club for train-
ing and development costs. 28 ' These transfer fees are calculated
by multiplying the player's gross annual income by a factor de-
pending on his age. 82
If a compulsory transfer does not take place before June 1,
the "free transfer"2 1 period begins, during which transfers re-
quire agreement between both clubs on the amount of a freely
negotiable transfer fee. 28 4 A club's failure to pay an agreed upon
transfer fee may result in sanctions imposed by the national asso-
ciation. 8 5 In the event that a player's affiliate club does not con-
clude a free transfer agreement, the club must offer him a new
contract for one season on the same terms offered before his
original contract expired.286 If the player refuses this offer, his
affiliate club will either suspend him or reclassify him as an ama-
276. Id.
277. Id. at 6-7, 9. Under URBSFA rules, professional contracts run for terms of
one to five years and all end on June 30. Id. These contracts are negotiated, but associ-
ation rules require certain minimum amounts of compensation, for example a mini-
mum monthly salary of BFR30,000 for professional players. Id.
278. Bosman, slip op. at 4, 7.
279. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 5, 1 7 (discussing
"compulsory transfer" period in contrast to "free" transfers, which require agreement of
former and new clubs).
280. Id.
281. Bosman, slip op. at 4-5, 8.
282. Id. at 4, 1 8.
283. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (discussing free transfers). The
free transfer period ranges fromJune 25 to December 31, depending on which division
the particular club is in. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 5,
9, n.17.
284. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 7, 9. Free transfers
favor a player's affiliate club, as that club can essentially demand any transfer fee,
thereby earning a substantial gain over a player's contract, or allowing the club to lock
the player in, requiring him to play for them, play on their terms, or not play at all. Id.
285. Bosman, slip op. at 5, 9. "[T]he new club must pay the old club [the agreed
upon transfer fee], subject to penalties which may include striking off the new club for
debt." Id.
286. Id. at 5, 1 10.
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teur. 8 v Once suspended, a player's only options are to reach an
agreement with his affiliate club or wait two years, after which he
may obtain a transfer as an amateur without his club's con-
sent.
288
Before an international transfer takes place, the UEFA and
FIFA regulations28 9 require that a player's former national asso-
ciation issue a transfer certificate acknowledging settlement of
all financial commitments, including those related to transfer
fees.29 ° Those regulations also stipulate that business relation-
ships between the clubs are not to influence a player's ability to
play for his new club.2 9 1 Under the most recent regulations,2 19 2
any dispute as to the amount of a transfer fee is submitted to
UEFA or FIFA293 for calculation according to a function of the
player's income, age, and, in some cases, achievement."
Beginning in the 1960's, football associations, including
291UEFA, introduced rules limiting the number of players of for-
eign nationality any club could field in a match. 96 These for-
eign player rules use the term "nationality" to refer to whether a
player is qualified to play for a country's national team, as op-
posed to a literal reference to a player's country of origin.297 In
287. Id. Amateur transfers fall under a different set of rules. Id. at 4, 7.
288. Id. at 5, 1 10.
289. Id. at 5-8, 11 11-21. "The UEFA and FIFA regulations are not directly applica-
ble to players but are included in the rules of the national associations .... " Id. 11.
290. Bosman, slip op. at 6, 1 16. Only the new club's national association is enti-
tled to request issuance of the transfer certificate. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz,
Bosman, slip op. at 11, 23. These requests may only be refused on grounds not related
to the transfer fee. Id.
291. Bosman, slip op. at 10, 21. "Without prejudice to the player's freedom of
contract, the acquiring club shall be obliged to pay compensation to the club with
which he was last registered." Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 7,
10 (quoting URBSFA regulations).
292. Id. at 11, 21. The most recent FIFA regulations came into force on January
1, 1994. Id.
293. Id. at 11-12, 24. Submission to FIFA is appropriate, for instance, when one
of the relevant clubs is not affiliated with UEFA. Id.; see Bosman, slip op. at 6, 1 20
(discussing requirement of submission to FIFA of UEFA in cases of disagreement over
transfer fees).
294. Bosman, slip op. at 6-7, 21. In the case of players who have played at least
twice on their country's senior national team, income is increased by 20% before calcu-
lating the transfer fee. Id.
295. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 16, 38.
296. Bosman, slip op. at 7, 25.
297. Id. Qualification to play for a national team often attaches importance to the
length of time a player has been affiliated with an association, as well as his actual
national origin. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 16, 37.
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1978, the Commission issued a press release 298 describing a gen-
tleman's agreement between UEFA and the Commission.29'
UEFA agreed to amend its rules to allow clubs to field not more
than three players who are nationals of other Member States,
plus two players counted as assimilated3 °° based on how long
they have played in the host Member State.s01
2. Case Law Dealing With Freedom of Movement in the Field
of Sport
In the 1970's, the ECJ held, in two preliminary rulings, that
rules of sporting associations are subject to Community law on
freedom of movement for workers.30 2 The first ruling, Walrave v.
Association Union Cycliste Internationale,303 involved two Dutch na-
tionals who wanted to work as motorcycle pacemakers304 for the
cycling teams of other Member States but were prohibited from
doing so by the rules of the Association Union Cycliste Internatio-
nale,305 requiring pacemakers of the same nationality as the
team's cyclists.3 0 6 In the second ruling, Dond v. Mantero,3 °7 the
ECJ considered Italian Football Federation rules allowing only
players affiliated with the federation, whose membership was
limited to Italian nationals, to participate in matches.3 0,
In Walrave, the Court ruled that the practice of sport has the
character of gainful employment or remunerated services when
298. Commission Press Release, IP (91) 316 (Apr. 18 1991).
299. See Bosman v. Commission, Case 117/91, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3354, [1991] 3
C.M.L.R. 938 [hereinafter Bosman v. Commission].
300. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 16, 39. Assimilated
players are players who have played in the country in question for five uninterrupted
years, including three years on junior teams. Id.
301. Bosman v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. 1-3355, 2, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 939-40.
Under the agreement, the rule initially applied to first division clubs in Member States
and was to extend to all non-amateur leagues by the end of the 1996-97 season. Id.
302. Walrave v. Union Cycliste Internationale, Case 36/64, [1974] E.C.R. 1405,
[1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320; Doni v. Mantero, Case 13/76, [19761 E.C.R. 1333, [1976] 2
C.M.L.R. 578.
303. Case 36/64, [1974] E.C.R. 1405, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320.
304. Id. at 1407, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 321. The pacemaker rides a motorcycle
ahead of a "stayer," whocycles behind the pacemaker in cycling competitions. Id.
305. Opinion of Advocate General Warner, Walrave [1977] E.C.R. at 1422, [1975]
C.M.L.R. at 324. Association Union Cycliste Internationale is an association of national
bodies concerned with cycling as a sport. Id.
306. Id. at 1407, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 322.
307. Case 13/76, [1976] E.C.R. 1333, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578.
308. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1417, 4. [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 322.
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it constitutes an economic activity within the meaning of EC
Treaty Article 2.09 In such circumstances, the practice of sport
is subject to Community law, including Article 48's prohibition
of nationality discrimination against workers."' 0 The Court,
however, excluded from the scope of Article 48 activities of
purely sporting interest, having nothing to do with economic ac-
tivity, including the formation of sport teams, particularly na-
tional teams. 311
The Court further held that Article 48 extends to any rules
designed to collectively regulate gainful employment services.3 1
The Court drew support for this conclusion 31 3 from Article 7(4)
of Regulation 1612/68,314 which prohibits nationality discrimina-
tion in agreements and collective regulations concerning em-
ployment. 31 5 The Court also noted that the abolition of obsta-
cles to freedom of movement contained in EC Treaty Article
3(c) 3 16 would be meaningless if such barriers could simply be
replaced by equally intrusive obstacles imposed by associations
or organizations not subject to public law.31 7
In Dond, the Court stated that the adoption of discrimina-
tory rules based on nationality, even by a "sporting organiza-
tion, ' 3 is incompatible with Article 48.319 The Court held that
the activities of professional or semi-professional football players,
which are in the nature of gainful employment or remunerated
services,32 constitute an economic activity subject to Community
law.32 ' Sporting association rules that discriminate based on na-
309. Id. at 1417, 4, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R at 322.
310. Id. at 1417, 5, [1975) 1 C.M.L.R. at 331.
311. Id. at 1418, 8, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332.
312. Id. at 1418, 1 17, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332.
313. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1419, 22, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332-33.
314. Council Regulation No. 1612/68, supra note 86, O.J. L 257/2 (1968).
315. Id. art. 7(4), O.J. L 257/1, at 4 (1968).
316. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588..
317. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1419, 18, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332. The Court
concluded with the observation that Article 48 applies to all legal relationships that can
be located within the Community by reason of the place where they are entered into or
the place where the relationships take effect. Id. at 1420, 28, (1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at
333.
318. Dorui, [1976] E.C.R. at 1340, 13, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 587.
319. Id.; see Union Nationale Des Entraineurs et Cadres Techniques Professionnels
du Football v. Heylens, Case 222/86, [1987] E.C.R. 4097, [1989] 1 C.M.L.R. 901 (hold-
ing that nationality discrimination regarding sports trainers violates Article 48).
320. Dond, [1976] E.C.R. at 1339, 1 9, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 586.
321. Id.
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tionality fall outside the scope of the EC Treaty only if they are
unrelated to economic activity and based on reasons purely of
sporting interest in light of the particular nature and context of
the matches involved.122 According to the Court, matches be-
tween national teams from different countries qualifies as a situa-
tion where rules discriminating on grounds of nationality arejus-
tified as relating to purely sporting interestsA 23
3. Competition Law in the Field of Sport
As a consequence of the Commission's exclusive role in
granting exemptions3 24 from EC competition rules,3 2 5 the ECJ
lacks the power to grant such exemptions. 26 Judicial considera-
tion of sporting association rules is common, however, in U.S.
antitrust law,3 27 which grants exemptions to practices of sporting
associations in certain circumstances. 28 U.S. courts developed a
non-statutory labor exemption to the Sherman Antitrust Act3 29
as a standard for evaluating the substance of agreements be-
tween unions and non-labor groups.33 0 The non-statutory labor
exemption protects an agreement331 from the antitrust laws if a
court finds that the facts surrounding the agreement justify giv-
ing precedence to relevant federal labor policy over federal anti-
trust policy.332 Non-statutory labor exemptions have been
322. Id. at 1340, 10, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587.
323. Id.
324. See supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text (discussing exemption proce-
dure under Article 85(3), which generally focuses on overall market effect of agree-
ments).
325. See supra notes 108-22 and accompanying text (discussing EC Treaty Articles
85 and 86).
326. See-supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing limited powers of EU
institutions).
327. See Chalian, supra note 6, at 595-605 (discussing U.S. antitrust law and its
application to professional sports).
328. See Fleming, supra note 3, at 530-31 (discussing non-statutory labor exemp-
tion to U.S. antitrust law).
329. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1994).
330. FLEMING, supra note 3, at 530-31.
331. See Chalian, supra note 6, at 597 n.12 ("Unions, by their very nature, are
groups of people acting together in restraint of free competition and trade."). The U.S.
Supreme Court "has recognized that a legitimate aim of any national labor organization
is to obtain uniformity of labor standards and that a consequence of such union activity
may be to eliminate competition based on differences in such standards." United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 666 (1965).
332. Id. The noi-statutory labor exemption has three elements:
[T] he labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-
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granted to preclude antitrust scrutiny of collective agreements
between sporting associations and players. 3 '
II. !N BOSMAN THE ECJ HELD THE TRANSFER SYSTEM AND
THE RULES ON FOREIGN PLAYERS INCOMPATIBLE
WITH COMMUNITY LAW
In the Bosmanjudgment,334 the ECJ issued a preliminary rul-
ing invalidating two long-standing football traditions under Arti-
cle 48.115 The Court held that the transfer system336 illegally ob-
structed players' freedom of movement.337 The Court also held
that the rules on foreign players33 8 resulted in nationality-based
eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint of trade primarily affects
only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship.... Second, federal
labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargain-
ing .... Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the
degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement
sought to be exempted is the product of a bona fide arm's length bargaining.
Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted).
The statutory labor exemption to the Sherman Act insulates legitimate labor activi-
ties unilaterally undertaken by a union in furtherance of its own interests, because such
activities are favored by federal labor policy. Fleming, supra note 3. at 530-31.
The concept of a labor exemption finds its source in sections 6 and 20 of the
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. section 17 and 29 U.S.C. section 52, and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. sections 104, 105 and 113. Those provisions declare
that labor unions are not ... in restraint of trade, and specifically exempt
certain union activities... from the coverage of the antitrust laws.
Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960, 963-64 (1987).
333. See e.g., National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45 F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995) (non-
statutory labor exemption to NBA collective bargaining agreement); Powell v. National
Football League, 888 F.2d 559 (8th Cir. 1989) (applying non-statutory labor exemption
to NFL collective bargaining agreement), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1040 (1991).
334. Bosman (Eur. Ct. J. Dec. 15, 1995) (not yet reported).
335. Id. at 22, 25, 114, 137.
336. See supra notes 276-94 and accompanying text (describing transfer system,
under which player's ability to change clubs depends on business transactions between
clubs).
337. Bosman, slip op. at 20, 100. The ECJ found that the transfer system ob-
structed freedom of movement for workers:
Since they provide that a professional footballer may not pursue his activity
with a new club established in another Member State unless it has paid his
former club a transfer fee agreed upon between the two clubs or determined
in accordance with the regulations of the sporting associations, the said rules
constitute an obstacle to freedom of movement for workers.
Id.
338. See supra notes 296-301 (describing foreign player rules which restrict how
many non-nationals clubs may field).
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discrimination prohibited by Article 48 .33 The Bosman case be-
gan when Belgian national Jean-Marc Bosman claimed he was
prevented from working for another club after his contract
ended with Royal Club IUgeois4. ("RC Liege"), in violation of Ar-
ticles 48, 85, and 86.34' The ECJ agreed that Article 48 precludes
the application of both the transfer and foreign player rules to
Member State nationals, 342 but refrained from discussing the ap-
plication of Articles 85343 and 86344 to Bosman's claims. 345
A. History of the Bosman Case
Belgian national Jean-Marc Bosman contracted with RC
Liige as a professional football player for an average monthly
salary of approximately 120,000 Belgian francs ("BFR"). 4  On
April 21, 1991, with Bosman's contract drawing to a close, RC
Liege offered him a one-year contract 347 at BFR30,000,3 48 the
league minimum. 349 Bosman refused the offer and was placed
339. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 137; see supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text
(discussing Article 48's express prohibition of nationality based discrimination regard-.
ing employment terms and conditions).
340. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 17, 42. Royal Club
IUgeois ("RC Liege") is a football club in the Belgian first division. Id.
341. See Competition: New Complaint Revives Controversy Over Football Transfer System,
EUR. REP., Feb. 2, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, CURNWS File.
342. Bosman, slip op. at 27, 1-2. The ECJ found that the transfer rules and the
rules on foreign players should not apply to Member State nationals:
Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes the application of rules laid down by
sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a national
of one Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be
employed by a club of another Member State unless the latter club has paid to
the former club a transfer, training or development fee[, and] precludes the
application of rules laid down by sporting associations under which, in
matches in competitions which they organize, football clubs may field only a
limited number of professional players who are nationals of other Member
States."
Id.
343. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [19911 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
344. Id. art. 86, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28.
345. Bosman, slip op. at 9, 1 38.
346. Id. at 8, 1 28.
347. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing URBSFA rules requir-
ing clubs to offer players new contracts at least 65 days before their current contract
expires).
348. Bosman, slip op. at 8, 29.
349. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing URBSFA rules and min-
imum player salary).
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on the compulsory transfer list,350 with a transfer fee set at
BFR11,743,000. 351 Because he did not secure a contract by the
end of the compulsory transfer period,352 Bosman contacted US
Dunkerque, a French second division team and signed a con-
tract with them for BFR100,000 a month plus a BFR900,000 sign-
ing bonus.353
In accordance with the procedure for free transfers, 354 US
Dunkerque and RC Liege concluded a separate contract for Bos-
man's temporary one season transfer for a compensation fee of
BFR1,200,000 plus an irrevocable option in favor of US Dunker-
que on a full transfer for BFR4,800,000. 355 Both contracts were
conditioned on receipt of the transfer certificate by the French
national association before August 2, 1990.356 Due to doubts
about US Dunkerque's solvency, RC Liege never requested issu-
ance of a transfer certificate from URBSFA and the contracts
never took effect.3 57 In addition, RC Liege suspended Bosman,
thereby preventing him from playing for the entire season.358
Shortly afterward, Bosman sued RC Liege before the Tribu-
nal de Premiere Instance, Liege, for lost wages. 359 The judge
ordered RC Liege and URBSFA to pay Bosman a monthly ad-
vance, issued a restraining order prohibiting RC Liege and URB-
SFA from interfering with his search for employment, and re-
ferred a question to the ECJ on the compatibility of the transfer
350. See supra note 279 and accompanying text (discussing that compulsory trans-
fer status lasts for one month and allows players to sign with new clubs in exchange for
non-negotiable transfer fee to player's old club, but not subject to old club's agree-
ment).
351. Bosman, slip op. at 7-8, 29; see supra note 282 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing compulsory transfer fee calculation).
352. See supra notes 279, 283 (discussing that compulsory transfers are available
only during month of May).
353. Bosman, slip op. at 8, 30.
354. See supra note 283 and accompanying text (discussing free transfers).
355. Bosman, slip op. at 8, 31.
356. Id. at 8, 32; see supra note 290 and accompanying text (discussing rules
requiring transfer certificates before international transfers take place).
357. Bosman, slip op. at 8, 33.
358. Id.
359. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 18, 1 45. In addition.
to seeking compensation from RC Liege and URBSFA of BFR 100,000 a month until he
found a new employer, Bosman sought an order restraining URBSFA and RC Liege
from damaging his employment opportunities by claiming or demanding a transfer fee.
Id. Bosman also sought a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling. Id.
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system with Community law.3 6° On appeal, the Cour d'Appel,
Liege, upheld the injunctive relief, but revoked the reference to
the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.3 6 1 Meanwhile, according to the
Cour d'Appel,362 circumstances suggested that despite Bosman's
free transfer status by virtue of the court order, 63 all the Euro-
pean clubs in positions to sign Bosman boycotted him instead.364
Bosman eventually did sign a contract with a Belgian third divi-
sion club. 65
In a separate action, Bosman applied to the ECJ for annul-
ment of the Commission's gentleman's agreement with UEFA.1
66
The Court, however, found that the Commission's actions were
limited to taking formal notice of UEFA's proposed rule
changes3 67 and, therefore, without legal effect and incapable of
affecting the interests of third parties, including Bosman.361 Ac-
cordingly, the Court dismissed Bosman's claim as inadmissi-
ble.369
Thereafter, on April 9, 1992, Bosman amended his original
claim against RC Liege, brought a new action against URBSFA,
and developed his claim against UEFA.170 The new claim sought
a declaration that the transfer system and the rules on foreign
players were null and void on grounds of breach of Articles 48,
360. Id.
361. Id. at 18, 1 46.
362. Bosman, slip op. at 9, 1 37.
363. See supra note 360 and accompanying text (discussing order of Tribunal de
Premier Instance, Liege, in Bosman's favor).
364. Bosman, slip op. at 9, 37.
365. Id. at 9, 36.
366. Bosman v. Commission, [1991] E.C.R. at 1-3355, 1, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 939;
see also supra note 180 (discussing ECJ jurisdiction to hear claims against EC Institu-
tions).
367. Bosman v. Commission, (1991] I E.C.R. at 1-3355, 2, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 939-
40. "[It is clear from a press release distributed by the Commission that it confined
itself... to taking formal notice of [rule changes proposed by UEFA]." Id.
368. Id. at 1-3356, 1 5, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 940.
369. Id. at 1-3357, 9, [1991] 3 C.M.L.R. at 941.
370. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 19, 49. URBSFA
voluntarily intervened in the action on June 3, 1991, seeking a declaration that the
transfer system was lawful. Id. at 18-19, 48. On August 20, 1991, Bosmanjoined UEFA
as a defendant. Id. Bosman's claim, as of April 9, 1992, sought an order restraining RC
Liege, URBSFA, and UEFA from hindering his freedom to contract with a new em-
ployer, an order for compensatory damages or more than BFR23,000,000. Id. at 19,
49. Bosman also sought a declaration that the transfer rules and rules on foreign play-
ers were not applicable to him, and a reference to the ECJ on the legality of those rules
under Community law. Id.
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85, and 86 of the EC Treaty." 1 After finding jurisdiction and
holding Bosman's claims admissible, the Tribunal de Premiere
Instance, Liege, made a reference to the ECJ for a preliminary
ruling on the interpretation of Articles 48, 85, and 86.372
On appeal, the Cour d'Appel upheld the judgment as to
jurisdiction and admissibility.373 The Cour d'Appel also found
that an assessment of Bosman's claims involved a review of the
legality of the transfer rules, thereby making a preliminary rul-
ing3 74 necessary to its judgment.37 5 The Cour d'Appel further
held that a preliminary ruling as to the lawfulness of the rules on
foreign players was necessary,37 6 in that Bosman based his claim
on Belgian law permitting actions to prevent the infringement of
a seriously threatened right,177 such as the potential damage to
Bosman's career by the application of the transfer rules. 37 The
court stayed the proceedings and referred two questions to the
ECJ 79 regarding the compatibility of the transfer rules and the
rules on foreign players with EC Treaty Articles 48,380 85,381 and
86.382
371. Id. at 19, 48.
372. See Bosman, slip op. at 10, 11 41, 44 (discussing judgment of Cour d'Appel).
373. Id. at 10, 44.
374. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing preliminary rulings
under Article 177).
375. Bosman, slip op. at 10, 1 44; see supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text
(discussing preliminary rulings as appropriate only when necessary to judgment of re-
ferring court).
376. Bosman, slip op. at 10, 1 44.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 11, 49. The ECJ considered two questions referred to it for a prelimi-
nary ruling:
Are Articles 48, 85, and 86 of the Treaty of Rome of 25 March 1957 to be
interpreted as:
(i) prohibiting a football club from requiring and receiving payment of a sum
of money upon the engagement of one of its players who has come to the end
of his contract by a new employing club;
(ii) prohibiting the national and international sporting associations from in-
cluding in their respective regulations provisions restriction access of foreign
players from the European Community to the competitions which they organ-
ize?
Id.
380. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
381. Id. art. 85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
382. Id. art. 86, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28.
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B. The ECJ Decision
The ECJ held that the transfer system and the rules on for-
eign players offended the principle of freedom of movement for
workers guaranteed by Article 48.384 The Court answered
both of the referred questions in the affirmative, but limited its
judgment and analysis to Article 48.385 The Opinion of Advocate
General Carl Otto Lenz, however, did examine the transfer rules
and the rules on foreign players under EC competition rules,
finding a restriction of competition"8 6 in violation of Article
85(1),387 but no infringement of Article 86."'8
1. Jurisdiction and Applicability of Article 48
After finding jurisdiction under Article 177389 to rule on the
referred questions, 9 ° the Court restated the applicability of Arti-
cle 48 to rules laid down by sporting associations.3 91 According
383. Bosman, slip op. at 22, 25, 11 113, 137.
384. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
385. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 1 138.
386. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 103-04, 1 262.
387. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text (discussing Article 85 (1)'s pro-
hibition of agreements restricting competition).
388. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 113, 286.
389. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing preliminary rulings
under Article 177).
390. Bosman, slip op. at 12-15, 11 55-67. Initially, the Court states that it is clear
from the statement submitted by the Cour d'Appel that the issues relating to the sub-
mitted questions are not merely hypothetical, and, therefore, are appropriate. Id. at 14,
1 62. Nevertheless, the Court went on to imply that even if the rules on transfers and
foreign players were not applied to Bosman, the Court's interpretation would still be
appropriate as it "may be- useful" to the national court in resolving the dispute over
Bosman's preventative actions. Id. at 14, 1 62-63. "[T]he questions submitted by [the
national court] meet an objective need for the purpose of settling disputes properly
brought before it." Id. at 14, 1 65.
391. Id. at 15-18, 69-87. Although the Court restated the Wairave holding that
Article 48 extends to any rules designed to regulate gainful employment in a collective
manner, the Court did not go so far as to expressly confer horizontal direct effect on
Article 48. Bosman, slip op. at 17, 1 82 (discussing Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1419, 24,
[19751 1 C.M.L.R. at 333; see supra note 220 (discussing horizontal direct effect). The
extent of regulation required for application of Article 48 depends on the extent to
which the rules in question frustrate Community policy by creating the functional
equivalent to Member State barriers to freedom of movement and the risk of unequal
application of Article 48 created by those rules. See Bosman, slip op. at 17-18, It 83-84
(applying Article 48 to rules of any nature aimed at collectively regulating gainful em-
ployment); see also Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418-19 11 17-19, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332-
33 (holding that Article 48 applies to rules of any nature aimed at collectively regulating
gainful employment); Dond, [1976] E.C.R. 1333, 1341, 1 17, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 587
(citing Walrave).
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to the Court, sport constitutes an economic activity subject to
Community law 92 if an employment relationship, or the inten-
tion to create one, exists."93 Bosman satisfied the criteria of Arti-
cle 48 by accepting an offer of employment actually made 94 in
another Member State.3 93  By virtue of Article 48's direct ef-
fect,3 9 6 Bosman could seek to have his right to move freely be-
tween Member States for purposes of employment judicially en-
forced.3 97
2. The ECJ's Interpretation of Article 48 with Respect to the
Transfer Rules
The Court considered the transfer rules an obstruction3 98 to
the fundamental Community principle 9 9 of freedom of move-
ment for workers guaranteed by Article 48.400 The UEFA stipula-
tion that the business relationship between clubs does not affect
the player's activity4 °" was irrelevant to the Court1°2 because the
required payment of a transfer fee has the effect of hindering
player access to employment." 3 The Court noted that obstacles
to freedom of movement are only justified by pressing concerns
392. Bosman, slip op. at 16, 1 76; Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1417-18, 5, 8, [1975]
1 C.M.L.R. at 331-32; Dond, [1976] E.C.R. at 1340, 11 12, 14, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587.
The proviso that Community law does not apply to rules or practices justified on non-
economic grounds related to the particular nature and context of certain matches re-
mains limited to its proper objective: protecting activities of purely sporting interest
from the constraints of Community law aimed at economic activities. Bosman, slip. op.
at 16, 76; Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418, 8, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332; Dona. [1976]
E.C.R. at 1340, 14, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587.
393. Bosman, slip op. at 16, 1 73-74.
394. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48(3)(a), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
395. Bosman, slip op. at 18, 89; see notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing that Article 48 does not apply to situations wholly internal to a Member State).
396. See supra notes 211-20 and accompanying text (discussing direct effect).
397. See supra notes 214-20 and accompanying text (discussing that treaty provi-
sions having direct effect create directly enforceable rights in Member State nationals).
398. See Bosman, slip op. at 20-21, 104 ("[T]he transfer rules constitute an obsta-
cle to freedom of movement for workers prohibited in principle by Article 48 of the
Treaty.").
399. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental free-
doms).
400. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
401. See supra note 291 and accompanying text (discussing UEFA's regulations).
402. Bosman, slip op. at 20, 101.
403. Bosman, slip. op. at 20, 99. Despite the stipulation that business relations
between clubs are not to affect a player's activity, "[tihe new club must still pay the fee
in issue, under pain of penalties.... which prevents it ... from signing up a player from
a club in another Member State without paying that fee." Id. at 20, 1 101; see supra note
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of public interest in pursuit of a legitimate aim compatible with
the EC Treaty. 4
The ECJ found no adequate justification for the obstacles to
freedom of movement imposed by the transfer rules.40 5 The
Court did, however, accept UEFA's goal of maintaining the fi-
nancial and competitive balance 1 6 as legitimate in light of the
social importance of sporting activity in the European Union.40 7
The Court found that the transfer' rules did not advance finan-
cial or competitive balance because those rules failed to preserve
the degree of equality and uncertainty of results necessary to
maintain the sporting equilibrium." 8 The rules did nothing to
prevent the richest clubs from securing the best players or to
prevent financial resources from being a decisive factor in com-
petition." 9 The Court also accepted UEFA's goal of encourag-
ing the recruitment and training of young talent as legitimate,410
but found no relationship between the transfer system and the
achievement of that goal.41' The Court found no relationship to
exist because the amount of a transfer fee is unrelated to the
actual cost of training and recruitment, and because receipt of
such fees for any particular player is speculative.41 2 The Court
285 and accompanying text (discussing sanctions imposed on clubs for not paying
agreed upon transfer fees).
404. Bosman, slip op. at 20-21, 104; see also supra note 231 and accompanying text
(discussing general principle of proportionality). According to Advocate General Lenz,
only an interest of the association of "paramount importance" can justify a restriction
on freedom of movement. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 87, 1
216.
405. Bosman, slip op. at 21-22, 105-14.
406. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 88, 219. A profes-
sional league will flourish only if the competitive balance between clubs is maintained.
Id. If the league is clearly and consistently dominated by any one team, the necessary
tension is absent and the fans will lose interest. Id.
407. Bosman, slip op. at 21, 106. "In view of the considerable social importance
of sporting activity and in particular football in the Community, the aims of maintain-
ing a balance between clubs by preserving a certain degree of equality and uncertainty
as to results and of encouraging the recruitment and training of young players must be
accepted as legitimate." Id.
408. Id. at 21, 107.
409. Id.
410. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate goals of
maintaining sporting equilibrium and encouraging recruitment).
411. Bosman, slip op. at 21, 1 109; see also supra note 234 and accompanying text
(discussing requirement of means-end relationship in context of proportionality princi-
ple).
412. Bosman, slip op. at 21, 109.
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further held that even if an adequate means-end relationship 13
did exist, the transfer system was not justified by either of these
goals, because less restrictive means of achieving them existed,4"4
such as a collective wage agreement 41 5 or a profit sharing
plan. 4
16
3. The ECJ's Interpretation of Article 48 with Respect to the
Rules on Foreign Players
The Court also found that the rules on foreign players ob-
structed freedom of movement for workers in Member States.41 7
Article 48's prohibition on nationality-based discrimination re-
garding employment, 418 as implemented by Council Regulation
1612/68,419 precludes the application of rules restricting access
413. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (discussing proportionality princi-
ple).
414. Bosman, slip op. at 21, 110. The Court also found that the potential for
differing systems inside and outside of the Community was not a compelling justifica-
tion for infringement on Article 48 because differing systems already existed between
certain national associations and the rules on international transfers. Id, at 22, 112.
Also, the losses that clubs will suffer in the future by not gaining a return on transfer
fees already paid in recruitment efforts is a necessary expense of eliminating obstacles
to freedom of movement. See Id. at 22, 113 (dismissing argument that transfer rules
are necessary to compensate clubs for expenses incurred in recruiting players).
415. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 90-91, 226 (dis-
cussing possibility of collective wage agreement).
416. See id. at 90-94, 226-33 (discussing possibility of profit sharing plan). Ad-
vocate General Lenz described the wisdom of a profit sharing plan, observing that the
competitive nature of sport differs from that existing in other markets in that sports
leagues are characterized by mutual economic dependence between clubs. Id. at 91,
227. Redistributing a proportion of income would make it possible for clubs to pro-
mote their own interests and those of football in general. Id. at 92, 1 228. If limited to
a small part of income, profit sharing measures appropriately ensure competitive bal-
ance between clubs, thereby preserving the incentive for a club to perform well. Id. at
92, 1 228-30. The feasibility of such a system is evidenced by its current existence in
some Member States, and also at the UEFA level in certain competitions. Id. at 92-93,
230-31. Such systems permit clubs to budget on a more reliable basis than the trans-
fer system, in which the discovery of a gifted player who can be transferred to a big club
for good money is often a matter of chance. Id. at 94, 233. Finally, any negative
effects on the self-esteem of any individual club would be purely psychological and in-
sufficient to justify a continued restriction on freedom of movement. Id. at 93-94,
232.
417. Id. at 43, 120.
418. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48(2), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612; see supra notes
87-89 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of movement for workers as based
mainly on principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality).
419. See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text (discussing Council Regulation
No. 1612/68).
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of Member State nationals to participation in competitions or-
ganized by those associations. 420  According to Walrave 2 1 and
Dond,422 this prohibition applies to rules of sporting associations
designed to collectively regulate gainful employment services.425
The Court found that by restricting a player's opportunity to par-
ticipate in matches based on his nationality, the rules on foreign
players limited that player's choices of employment4 24 in viola-
tion of Article 48.425
No sufficient justification existed for the obstacle imposed
on freedom of movement by the rules on foreign players, there-
fore, the Court declared those rules incompatible with Article
48.426 The Court further held that UEFA's reliance on its gen-
tleman's agreement with the Commission was misplaced, be-
cause the Commission cannot guarantee compatibility with
Community law except where expressly authorized to do so.4 27
Under no circumstances may the Commission authorize prac-
tices that are contrary to the TEU.4 28 The rules on foreign play-
ers did not adequately maintain the sporting equilibrium be-
420. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 137. It is irrelevant that the rules do not expressly
limit the number of foreign players that may be employed. Id. By limiting participation
in matches, the essential element of a professional player's activity, the rules obviously
also restrict a player's chances of employment. Id.
421. See supra notes 309-10 and accompanying text (discussing sport as an eco-
nomic activity contemplated by EC Treaty Article 2). "Prohibition of [nationality] dis-
crimination does not only apply to the action of public authorities but extends likewise
to rules of any other nature aimed at regulating in a collective manner gainful employ-
ment and the provision of services." Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418, 1 18, [1975] 1
C.M.L.R. at 332-33.
422. See supra notes 318-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Dond judg-
ment). Dond specifically held that Article 48 precluded rules limiting foreign players:
[R]ules or a national practice, even adopted by a sporting organization, which
limit the right to take part in football matches as professional or semi-profes-
sional players solely to the nationals of the State in question, are incompatible
with Article 7 and ... Article[ ] 48 ... unless such rules or practice exclude
foreign players from participation in certain matches for reasons which are
not of an economic nature ....
Dond, [1976] E.C.R. at 1341, 1 19, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587 (relying on Walrave).
423. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418, 18, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320, 332-33; Dond,
[1976] E.C.R. at 1341, 1 19, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578, 587.
424. Bosman, slip op. at 23, 120. "In so far as participation in such matches is the
essential purpose of a professional player's activity, a rule which restricts that participa-
tion obviously also restricts the chances of employment." Id.
425. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
426. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 137.
427. Id. at 25, 136.
428. Id.
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tween clubs,42 9 because those rules did nothing to prevent afflu-
ent clubs from acquiring the best national players, which would
undermine the competitive balance despite the foreign player
rules.4 3° The Court emphasized that while freedom of move-
ment for workers may reduce employment opportunities for
Member State nationals within their own countries, it also cre-
ates new prospects of employment in other Member States.4"'
4. The ECJ's Limitation of the Temporal Effects of the
Bosman Judgment
In the interests of legal certainty,432 the ECJ limited the tem-
poral effects of its judgment to preclude retroactivity. 433 The
Court eliminated the possibility of suits based on transfer fee ob-
ligations arising before the Bosman43 4 judgment by expressly re-
stricting reliance on Article 48's 435 prohibition of the transfer
system 436 to claims initiated after that date.437  The Court did
not extend this limitation to claims regarding the rules on for-
eign players.438 According to the Court, in light of the
Walrave439 and Dond440 judgments," it was unreasonable to con-
429. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate goals of
maintaining sporting equilibrium and encouraging recruitment, in light of social im-
portance of football in European Union).
430. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 135. The Court rejected the proposition that main-
taining the public perception of a link between clubs and their countries justifies the
obstruction of freedom of movement. Id. at 24, 131-32. The Court found this argu-
ment unconvincing in light of the lack of measures to maintain a link between a club
and its locality within a Member State, and because international competitions are or-
ganized based on team performance, rather than player nationality. Id. Finally, the
court felt that maintaining a pool of national players for national teams was an inade-
quate goal, because association rules permitted players to play for their national team
regardless of where they are registered to play. Id. at 24, 133.
431. Id. at 25, 134.
432. See supra notes 230, 243-46 and accompanying text (discussing considerations
of legal certainty which have led ECJ to limit temporal effects of some judgments to
preclude retroactive effect).
433. Bosman, slip op. at 26, 145.
434 Id.
435. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
436. See supra notes 399-416 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's holding that
transfer system constitutes unjustified violation of Article 48).
437. Bosman, slip op. at 26, 1 145.
438. Id.
439. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. 1405, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. 320.
440. Dond, [1976] E.C.R. 1333, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 578.
441. See supra notes 309-23 (discussing Walrave and Dond, which held that sporting
association rules discriminating based on nationality violate Article 48).
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sider the discrimination resulting from the foreign player rules
compatible with Article 48.442
5. Interpretation of Article 85 with Regard to the Transfer
Rules and the Rules on Foreign Players
The ECJ did not address the transfer rules and the rules on
foreign players under Articles 85 43 and 86 4  once it found
those rules illegal445 under Article 48.446 Advocate General
Lenz's opinion 447 did present a clear analysis of the rules in that.
context.448 The Advocate General found no abuse of a domi-
nant position in violation of Article 86, because the rules af-
fected only the relationship between clubs and players, as op--
posed to the power on the market exercised by the clubs in rela-
tion to competitors, customers, or consumers. 4 4 9
The Advocate General also concluded that both sets of rules
fell within the scope of Article 85(1) ,450 as restrictions of compe-.
tition.451 The rules on foreign players restrict the opportunities
for clubs to compete with each other in recruiting players,
thereby constituting an agreement sharing sources of supply45
within the meaning of Article 85(1) (c).453 In Advocate General
Lenz's opinion, the transfer rules restricted competition by re-
placing the normal system of supply and demand.454 He found
that holding players to their former clubs after their contracts
expire preserves the existing competition situation, thereby de-
priving clubs of the opportunities that would otherwise exist
442. Bosman, slip op. at 26, 146. "With regard to nationality clauses ... there
are no grounds for a temporal limitation of the effects of this judgment." Id.
443. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
444. Id. art. 86, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627-28.
445. Bosman, slip op. at 25, 138.
446. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
447. See supra note 182 (discussing role of Advocate General as non-binding advi-
sor to ECJ whose opinions are often followed).
448. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 99-113, 1 253-86.
449. Id. at 112-13, 286.
450. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
451. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 113, 287.
452. Id. at 103, 262.
453. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(1)(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627. "[I]t is...
perfectly clear that the effect of the rules at issue in this case is a restriction of competi-
tion within the meaning of Article 85(1)." Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman
slip op. at 103, 262.
454. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 103, 262.
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under normal competition conditions. 455 While the Advocate
General observed that it is theoretically possible for the Commis-
sion to grant such rules an exemption 456 from Article 85,457 he
concluded that an exemption would not remedy the breach458 of
Article 48.159 Accordingly, the Advocate General dismissed the
possibility of exemption due to the significance of a breach of
Article 48.460
III. EXEMPTING SPORTS ASSOCIATIONS FROM APPLICATION
OF ARTICLE 48 WOULD BE INCONSISTENT WITH
THE COMMON MARKET AND WOULD
DISREGARD THE EXISTENCE OF
ALTERNATVES THAT DO NOT OFFEND ARTICLE 48
The Bosman case represents a sound and fair judgment, in
light of established Community policy, doctrine, and tradition,
that should not be overridden by amendment at the 1996
IGC. 41 Exempting professional sports associations from Article
48462 contradicts the consistently strong protection given to Arti-
cle 48 by the TEU and the ECJ in furtherance of the common
market.465 Furthermore, creating such an exemption would be
premature because the interests asserted by the sporting associa-
tions4 64 to support the proposed amendment are better served
455. Id.
456. Id. at 110, 278; see supra notes 164-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Art. 85(3) exemption procedure).
457. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 626-27.
458. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 110, 278.
459. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
460. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz. Bosman. slip op. at 110, 278. In the
Advocate General's opinion, exemption from Article 85 was not appropriate:
[A]n exemption would ... make no difference to the breach of Article 48, it
would make sense for the Commission to take that factor into account in the
exemption procedure. A uniform result ought to be aimed at in any case.
That would mean that an exemption under Article 85(3) would also have to
be ruled out.
Id.
461. See supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing TEU's requirement of
1996 IGC to discuss proposals for amendments).
462. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
463. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing common market as
means for achieving EU goals).
464. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's acceptance of
maintaining sporting equilibrium as legitimate goal); see also supra note 410 (discussing
ECJ's acceptance of goal of encouraging recruitment and development of young talent
as legitimate).
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by alternative means that do not offend Article 48.465 Freedom
of movement for workers and the abolition of nationality dis-
crimination are pervasive themes of the EC Treaty.4 66 As neces-
sary components of the common market, 467 fundamental free.-
doms468 must not be infringed, except in circumstances involv.-
ing pressing concerns of public interest.469 Even then, such
infringements may result only from utilization of the least re--
strictive means available.47 °
A. Article 48's Fundamental Freedoms Merit Vigilant Protection That
Should Not be Circumvented by Amendment of the TEU
The free movement of workers guaranteed by Article 48"'
is central to the framework of the European Union.4 72 The ab-
sence of an exception to Article 48173 based on considerations
relevant to rules of sporting associations evidences the intent of
the TEU 474 to protect freedom of movement for professional
athletes.475  Furthermore, the broad interpretation and corre-
spondingly expansive protection given to Article 48 by the EU
465. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, (1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
466. See supra notes 80, 87 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of move.-
ment, characterized by abolition of nationality discrimination, as Community founda-
tion).
467. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing common market as one
principal method through which European Union is to accomplish its tasks).
468. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of move-
ment for workers as fundamental freedom).
469. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing principle of propor-
tionality, under which limitations on individual's freedom of action must be necessary
to public interest).
470. See Bosman, slip op. at 20-21, 104 (holding that transfer rules violate princi-
ple of proportionality); see also supra notes 231-39 and accompanying text (discussing
proportionality).
471. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
472. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing common market as
principal Community activity).
473. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
474. See TEU, supra note 8, pmbl., O.J. C 224/1, at 2-3 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R.
at 726 (setting forth Member States' "respect for ... fundamental freedoms," determi-
nation to promote "the accomplishment of the internal market," and "[reaffirming]
their objective to facilitate the free movement of persons.").
475. See id. art. B, O.J. C 224/1, at 5 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 727 (providing
for EU objective of promoting economic progress through creation of internal market);
EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 7a, 1 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 592 (defining internal mar-
ket as area without internal frontiers, in which freedom of movement for persons is
ensured); id. art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (describing EU task of promoting "a har-
monious and balanced development of economic activities"); see also supra notes 309-11,
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institutions476 exposes the impropriety of an amendment creat-
ing an exemption from Article 48.
1. Freedom of Movement for Workers is a Pervasive Theme of
the EC Treaty and is Essential to the Goal of a
Common Market
Freedom of movement for persons477 and, more particu-
larly, for workers,4 78 are pervasive themes of the EC Treaty4
79
that should not be compromised by amendment."' Free move-
ment of persons is one of the primary means of achieving and
maintaining the common market, which is a principal goal of
the TEU. 481  An amendment permitting obstruction of the free
movement of workers would derogate the TEU by preventing
the European Union from achieving a common market with re-
spect to an entire segment of the market, the sports industry.482
Excepting rules imposed by non-public authorities intended
to regulate gainful employment from Article 48 would render
the abolition of government-imposed obstacles to freedom of
movement meaningless and would simply replace one form of
obstruction with equally offensive alternatives. 48 ' Allowing this
continued obstruction of the free movement of workers would
320-22, 391-97 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ holdings in Walrave, Dond, and
Bosman, that sport is subject to Community law when it constitutes economic activity).
476. See supra notes 84-98, 141-52, 191-200 (discussing Article 48, Council Regula-
tion No. 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers, and ECJ's broad interpretation
of freedom of movement).
477. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
478. Id. art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
479. See e.g., id. art. 3(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 (requiring free movement of
persons); id. art. 7a, 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 592 (describing internal market as "an
area ... in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is en-
sured"); id. arts. 48-51, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-13 (providing for free movement of
workers); id. arts. 52-58, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 613-16 (providing for right of establish-
ment, as sub-part of free movement of persons).
480. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying efforts of
football associations for amendment of TEU).
481. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (discussing common market as
means for achieving Community goals).
482. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 2, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588 ("[B]y establish-
ing a common market [the Community shall] promote... a harmonious and balanced
development of economic activities . . . ."); see also supra notes 309-11, 320-22, 391-97
and accompanying text (discussing that sport is subject to Community law when it con-
stitutes economic activity within the meaning of EC Treaty Article 2).
483. See supra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's application of
Article 48 to non-public authorities).
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contradict one of the fundamental objectives of the Commu-
nity48 4 and create a risk of inequality in the application of Com-
munity law.485 The objectives of the common market 48 6 are pri-
marily achieved by establishing and maintaining an internal mar-
ket,48 7 characterized by the abolition of obstacles to freedom of
movement for persons throughout the Community.488 Article
6489 and the general principle of equal treatment 490 prohibit na-
tionality discrimination within the scope of application of the
TEU. 4 91 Article 48 specifically integrates the general concepts of
non-discrimination and the internal market by ensuring free-
dom of movement for workers,492 such as professional ath-
letes,49 " within the European Union.494 Exempting rules of
sports associations from Article 48 would eliminate the firmly es-
tablished principles of freedom of movement 495 and non-dis-
crimination 4 1 in a significant segment of the internal market,
497
thereby frustrating the goals of the common market.4
98
484. Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418-19, 1 17-18, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332-33; Dond,
[1976] E.C.R. at 1341, 17 (citing Walrave), [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587; Bosman, slip op.
at 17, 82; see also supra note 391 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of
Article 48 to rules laid down by sporting associations).
485. See Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1419 19, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 333 (justifying
application of Article 48 beyond public authorities).
486. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing EC Treaty objectives
enumerated in Article 2).
487. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588; see supra notes
72-74 and accompanying text (discussing internal market).
488. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
489. Id. art. 6, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 591.
490. See supra notes 240-42 and accompanying text (discussing general principle of
equal treatment under Community law).
491. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (discussing TEU's precedence over
national laws inconsistent with TEU).
492. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
493. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing Walrave holding that
sport is subject to Community law insofar as it constitutes economic activity).
494. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
495. Id.
496. Id. arts. 6, 48, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 591, 612.
497. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's recognition
of need to preserve viability of sports leagues in light of their social importance).
498. See supra notes 67-72, 486 and accompanying text (discussing common mar-
ket objectives).
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2. The Structure of Article 48 Recognizes Specific Exceptions
Based on Principles Not Relevant to the Practice
of Sport
EC Treaty Article 3 provides for the abolition of obstacles to
fundamental freedoms,499 including freedom of movement for
persons,5 °° as a means of promoting development of economic
activities.50 ' Subsequent articles, such as Article 48,502 provide
additional, specific protection for these freedoms.5 °5 The delib-
erate structure of the EC Treaty in this regard illustrates the EC
Treaty's intended application to all economic activities between
Member States, except as specifically provided for.50 4
The only exceptions recognized by Article 48505 deal with
protecting the general interests of a Member State or other pub-
lic health, safety, or policy concerns specifically relevant to the
individual whose freedom of movement is affected. 5 6 The infer-
ence from the absence of special provisions for the practice of
sport is that the prerogative of a sporting association to regulate
itself at the expense of EU citizens5 7 does not rise to a level
deserving exemption from Article 48.508 Sporting association in-
terests do not resemble interests of the general welfare,50 9 which
are specifically given overriding importance by the exceptions
contained in Article 48.510
499. See supra notes 43, 53 (discussing EU goal of establishing internal market).
500. See supra notes 77-85 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental free-
doms, including freedom of movement for persons).
501. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 3, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588-89.
502. Id. art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
503. See id. arts. 48-51, 52-58, 59-66, 67-73h, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612-13, 613-16,
616-18, 618-23 (providing for free movement of workers, right of establishment, free-
dom to provide services, and free movement of capital and payments).
504. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing specific exceptions
enumerated in Article 48(3)).
505. Id. art. 48(3), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
506. See supra notes 95-98, 200 (discussing exceptions to Article 48, and ECJ's nar-
row interpretation of those exceptions).
507. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing EU citizenship).
508. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
509. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing Article 48's excep-
tions for public policy, security, or health reasons, and exemption for jobs in public
service).
510. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48(3), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612; see also supra
notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing Article 48(3)).
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3. Amending the TEU in Favor of Sports Associations Would
Be Contrary to the Rigid Protection and Broad Scope
Given to Article 48 by EU Institutions
The ECJ's deferential treatment 51' of Article 48 and the re-
strictive approach taken toward application of Article 48's excep-
tions512 strongly counsel against creating a wholesale exemption
from the application of Article 48513 for rules laid down by sport-
ing associations. The ECJ, as the final authority on interpreta-
tion of TEU provisions,51 4 ruled that because the terms of Article
48 define a fundamental freedom,51 5 they must be interpreted
broadly.51 6 Conversely, because the exceptions contained in Ar-
ticle 48(3) impose limitations on a fundamental freedom, the
Court interprets them narrowly. 517 The ECJ's rigid protection of
freedom of movement for workers,5 1 8 particularly in the context
of sport,5 19 illustrates Article 48's significance to the European
Union, suggesting that an amendment to circumvent Article 48
is improper.520
511. See supra notes 193-98 and accompanying text (describing ECJ's broad appli-
cation of Article 48).
512. See supra notes 199-200 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's narrow in-
terpretation of Article 48's exceptions).
513. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991) 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
514. See EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 164, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 684 ("The Court
ofJustice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is
observed."); see also supra note 178 (discussing role of ECJ).
515. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text (discussing Community mean-
ing of term "worker").
516. See Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-Wirttemberg, Case 66/85, [1986] E.C.R.
2121, 21441 16. [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 389, 414 (interpreting Article 48 broadly); Levin v.
Staatssecretaris van Justitie, Case 53/81, [1982] E.C.R. 1035, 1049 9, [1982] 2
C.M.L.R. 467 (same); see also supra note 197 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's
broad interpretation of Article 48).
517. See supra note 200 and accompanying text (illustrating ECJ's limited interpre-
tation of Article 48(3)).
518. See supra notes 193-200 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's interpreta-
tion of Article 48 in ways that promote common market).
519. See supra notes 303-23, 399-431 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's
holdings in Walrave, Dond, and Basman, against sporting associations under Article 48).
520. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing lobbying efforts of
football associations for TEU amendment).
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B. Amending the TEU to Perpetuate the Transfer Rules or the Rules
on Foreign Players is Unjustifiable and Unnecessary because
the Objectives Offered in Support of Such an
Amendment are Better Served by.
Means that do not Obstruct Freedom of Movement
An amendment in favor of the transfer system or the rules
on foreign players would legalize rules that lack legitimate objec-
tives. 52 ' Even if an appropriate relationship did exist between
the ends asserted by the sporting associations and the transfer
system or the foreign player rules, an amendment would still be
unnecessary because the sporting associations could utilize alter-
native methods of achieving those same objectives without ob-
structing freedom of movement.522 Accordingly, allowing sport-
ing associations to obstruct freedom of movement is unnecessary
and unjustifiable.
1. The Potentially Legitimate Objectives Asserted in Favor of
Rules on Foreign Players Are Already Provided for by
the Existing Treaty Provisions
A TEU amendment exempting sporting associations from
Article 48 based on the cultural or sporting aspects of sporting
activities is not warranted because such aspects are already pro-
tected by Article 48. Article 48 does not apply to the practice of
sport in situations of purely sporting interest,523 but only to activ-
ities in the nature of gainful employment or remunerated serv-
ices."2 ' The ECJ has recognized that the sporting interests as-
serted in support of rules on foreign players are beyond the
scope of Article 48.525 When association rules discriminate with
respect to an economic activity, however, Article 48 intervenes to
521. See supra notes 405-16, 426-31 and accompanying text (discussing Bosman de-
cision, which held that transfer system and rules on foreign players were notjustified by
public interest concerns).
522. See supra notes 415-16 and accompanying text (discussing existence of less
restrictive alternatives to transfer system).
523. See Walrave, [1974] E.C.R. at 1418, [1975] 1 C.M.L.R. at 332 (restricting appli-
cation of Article 48 to rules of economic nature); Dond, [1976] E.C.R. at 1341, 19,
[1976] 2 C.M.L.R. 587 (citing Walrave).
524. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 48, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 612.
525. Dond, [1976] E.C.R. at 1340, 14, [1976] 2 C.M.L.R. at 587. In Dond, the ECJ
specified that rules excluding foreign players from certain matches of sporting interest
only, such as those between national teams, are not prohibited by Article 48. Id.
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promote the general principle of equal treatment 526 and the spe-
cific EU goal of eliminating nationality discrimination within the
common market.527
The argument for special treatment of professional sport as
a mixed economic and cultural activity lacks merit because the
practice of sport is not confined within Member States, but ex-
tends its cultural and social sporting aspects to all Member
States.528 Permitting barriers between Member States in any
market sector contradicts the Community's task of promoting
economic and social cohesion among Member States.52 9 In con-
trast, the evolution of the practice of sport on a Community-wide
basis would directly promote economic and social unity by elimi-
nating barriers to inter-Member State club development and re-
cruitment.
2. No Relationship Exists Between the Transfer System and
the Objectives Asserted in Support of that System
The ECJ conceded two potentially legitimate goals of the
transfer system,530 but found that the transfer system was an in-
adequate means of achieving those objectives.5 3' Because trans-
fer fees are calculated as a function of the player's earnings,53 2
and because bigger clubs usually pay higher wages,53 smaller
clubs rarely will be in a position to acquire good players from the
big clubs. The transfer system perpetuates this disparity by
widening the gap between richer and poorer clubs, thereby dis-
torting the sporting equilibrium more than stabilizing it. Fur-
thermore, the transfer system does not encourage recruitment
or training of young talent because receipt of a transfer fee for
526. See supra notes 240-42 (discussing principle of equal treatment, which prohib-
its treating similar situations differently, and different situation similarly, unless objec-
tively justified).
527. See supra notes 87-89 and accompanying text (discussing principle of non-
discrimination on grounds of nationality).
528. See supra notes 406-07, 429, 497 (discussing importance of sport in European
Union).
529. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 2, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 588.
530. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's conclusions that
maintaining sporting equilibrium and encouraging recruitment and training of young
talent are legitimate goals).
531. See Bosman, slip op. at 22, 14.
532. See supra notes 282, 294 and accompanying text (discussing calculation of
transfer fees).
533. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 90, 224.
1996] 1309
1310 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1255
any given player is uncertain, and because transfer fees are not
related to the actual costs of recruitment and development. 5 4
Once it is established that no relationship exists between
the transfer system and the legitimate goals offered in its sup-
port, the argument in favor of amending the TEU becomes cir-
cular. Essentially, creating an exemption from Article 48131 for
sporting associations would allow a restriction on freedom of
movement to stand merely for the sake of restricting freedom of
movement.53 6 Member State governments at the 1996 IGC53 7
should be wary of the deceptive logic in favor of an amendment
and should examine any purportedly legitimate objectives of-
fered in support of the transfer system with this argument in
mind. 38
3. The True Goals of the Rules on Transfers and Foreign
Players Are Not Legitimate
The tenuous relationship between the transfer system and
public interest concerns53 9 illustrates that the true objective of
those seeking to preserve the transfer system, despite the Bosman
judgment,540 is to maintain the status quo.54 1 European football
under the transfer system is feudalistic in nature, tying players to
534. Bosman, slip op. at 21, 108.
535. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text (discussing football association
lobbying efforts for TEU amendment).
536. See Bosman, slip op, at 22, 113.
[T]he argument that the rules in question are necessary to compensate clubs
for the expenses which they have had to incur in paying fees on recruiting
their players cannot be accepted, since it seeks to justify the maintenance of
obstacles to freedom of movement for workers simply on the ground that such
obstacles were able to exist in the past.
Id.
537. See supra notes 32-33, 64-66 (discussing IGCs, including IGC scheduled to be-
gin at end of March 1996).
538. See Bosman, slip op. at 22, 1 112 (dismissing arguments that eliminating trans-
fer system in European Union would cause demise of worldwide organization of foot-
ball, because different systems have existed in different countries in past); see also id. at
22, 1 113 (dismissing as circular argument that transfer system is necessary to compen-
sate clubs for recruitment expenses).
539. See supra notes 530-34 and accompanying text (describing absence of relation-
ship between transfer system and legitimate objectives).
540. Bosman (Eur. Ct. J. Dec. 15, 1995) (not yet reported).
541. See supra note 416 (describing mutually codependent economic positions of
sports teams). Although the unique nature of competition in a sports market suggests
that the necessary balance between clubs occurs almost automatically, "[ejxperience
shows . . . that club managements do not always calculate that way, but may at times
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clubs like medieval serfs.542 In effect, the freedom of movement
guaranteed to players by Article 48 is bought and sold like a
commodity on the open market, without any requirement of
player consent.543  While it may be logical from an economic
point of view for the clubs benefiting from such a system to at-
tempt to entrench themselves in their positions of control, these
efforts are not consistent with the purposes underlying the EC
Treaty5" or its reform. 545
In addition to offending Article 48 through the obstruction
of freedom of movement for workers,546 the transfer system vio-
lates Article 85(1)- 4' by distorting competition within the com-
mon market.548 The transfer system constitutes an agreement
sharing sources of supply,549 thereby restricting the opportuni-
ties for clubs to compete with each other in recruitment.
550
Member State governments should reject proposals for an
amendment to the TEU, because the anti-competitive effects of
the transfer system reveal its self-serving nature.55' The level of
economic control exercised by sporting associations under the
transfer system restricts competition and freedom of movement
to an extent not merely incidental to attempting to promote a
allow themselves to be led by considerations other than purely sporting or economic
ones." Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 88-89, 1 221.
542. Court Advocate-General Puts Boot in Football's Transfer System, EUR. Soc. POL'Y,
Oct. 1, 1995, available in WESTLAW, PTS-NEWS Database; see also Nick Matthews, A
Game of Two Halves: Moving the Goal Posts, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'y, Dec. 1, 1995 at 26
("Football clubs have always treated players like slaves .... ").
543. See supra note 284 and accompanying text (discussing free transfer period).
544. See supra note 67-72 and accompanying text (discussing Community objectives
found in Article 2).
545. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing 1996 IGC).
546. See supra note 398 and accompanying text (discussing and quoting ECJ's hold-
ing in Bosman, that transfer system illegally obstructs freedom of movement for work-
ers).
547. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(1), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 62-27 (prohibiting
agreements and practices that restrict common market competition).
548. See supra note 451 and accompanying text (discussing Advocate General
Lenz's conclusion that transfer system violates Article 85(1)).
549. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(1)(c), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627 (such an
agreement falls within Article 85(1)).
550. See supra notes 453-55 and accompanying text (discussing Advocate General's
analysis).
551. See supra notes 27-29 (discussing possibility of proposals for TEU amend-
ment).
1996] 1311
1312 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:1255
legitimate public interest.552
4. Amending the TEU is Unnecessary Because Alternative
Means Exist to Finance and Maintain Competitive
Balance in Sports Without Offending
Article 48
While, in principle, there is nothing offensive about sports
associations exercising their autonomy by implementing rules to
regulate their activities, those rules may not legally obstruct a
fundamental freedom of the European Union.55 Even if legiti-
mate objectives supported the transfer system,554 its rules would
only withstand judicial scrutiny if they were necessary to achieve
those legitimate objectives.555 These criteria are not satisfied
when there are adequate alternative means of protecting the as-
sociation's interest without infringing on fundamental freedoms.
The possibility of transfer systems continuing in non-Mem-
ber States belonging to UEFA or FIFA does not undermine the
feasibility of alternative systems. To the contrary, this possibility
corresponds to the logic of the internal market5 6 by placing all
Member States on equal footing regarding transfers within the
European Union and transfers from non-Member States.55 7 In
fact, some Member States558 already operate under systems dif-
ferent from the FIFA system for international transfers559 with-
out disastrous results. 560
In order to preserve their own interests, 61 the associations
should begin looking into alternative systems as quickly as possi-
552. See supra note 233 and accompanying text (discussing principle of propor-
tionality).
553. See supra note 239 and accompanying text (discussing principle of propor-
tionality with respect to fundamental freedoms).
554. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 87, 1 216. In such
circumstances, "only an interest of the association which is of paramount importance
could justify a restriction on freedom of movement." Id. (citation omitted).
555. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of
least restrictive means in cases of conflict with fundamental freedoms).
556. See supra notes 53, 74 and accompanying text (discussing internal market).
557. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 97-98, 246.
558. Bosman, slip op. at 7, 122-23 (discussing transfer system in France and Spain).
559. See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text (describing FIFA regulations).
560. Bosman, slip op. at 7, 1 22-23.
561. See supra note 407 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's conclusions that
maintaining sporting equilibrium and encouraging recruitment and training of young
talent are legitimate goals).
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ble.562 After Bosman, professional athletes in the European
Union are essentially free agents,5 63 with significantly more bar-
gaining power than they have had in the past.564 Once player
unions organize and realize the full potential of their bargaining
strength, the clubs and associations will be forced to negotiate
with them. To ease the transition into the collective bargaining
process, the associations should initiate a system likely to be ac-
ceptable to all parties involved.
One possible alternative is a revenue-sharing system,
whereby clubs contribute a certain percentage of their income
to the association, to be redistributed among its clubs. 56 5 Reve-
nue-sharing systems preserve the competitive and financial bal-
ance566 between clubs by ensuring the financial viability of clubs,
including the smaller clubs, as long as the association remains
viable. The association will remain viable as long as the dues are
not too large in relation to the club's overall income.5 6 7 By not
requiring clubs to contribute too much money, the incentive to
perform well is preserved, which in turn maintains spectator in-
terest.568 That incentive satisfies the public's and the associa-
tions' interests in encouraging the recruitment and develop-
ment of talent.
Another feasible alternative is to establish a farm system 569
similar to that of American baseball.57 The big, high profile
clubs could sponsor the smaller clubs with the money tradition-
562. Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 89, 223. "[I]t is of
fundamental importance to share income out between the clubs in a reasonable man-
ner." Id.
563. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing free agency systems,
under which professional athletes may freely change sports teams after their contracts
expire).
564. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing free agency, which gives
players control over where they play).
565. See supra note 416 and accompanying text (discussing Advocate General
Lenz's description of revenue sharing system).
566. See supra note 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate goal of
maintaining sporting equilibrium).
567. See Opinion of Advocate General Lenz, Bosman, slip op. at 90-91, 226 (dis-
cussing possibility of collective wage agreements).
568. See supra note 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing legitimate goal of
maintaining sporting equilibrium).
569. See Katz, supra note 1, at 377 n.46. The system is a "farm" system in that the
clubs are "growing, developing, and training" new talent. Id.
570. See id. at 377-78 (discussing evolution of Minor League Baseball in United
States).
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ally allocated to transfer fees.57 1 The smaller clubs would, in
turn, recruit and develop talent5 72 to compete in the farm league
with hopes of moving on to the higher division clubs. Introduc-
ing this system in conjunction with an income-sharing plan
would ensure competitive balance among clubs to an even
greater extent.573 Income contributions could be placed in a
fund toward maintenance of a competitive farm system. This
would preclude any one big club from dominating the farm
clubs and monopolizing the flow of new talent. Another possi-
bility is the institution of an amateur draft574 in conjunction with
the farm league to maintain an equal distribution of talent
among the smaller clubs, thereby contributing to the sporting
equilibrium.
Another alternative is to simply sign new players to longer
contracts. For example, instead of concluding a two-year con-
tract and then demanding a transfer fee, clubs could issue four-
year contracts and negotiate with other clubs after two years to
buy-out the balance of the contract. The former club has a legit-
imate interest in the contract, which they have a right to be com-
pensated for, thereby achieving a result equivalent to that of the
transfer system. A contractual buy-out would not offend Article
48 because the player's freedom of movement is limited by virtue
of his own bargained-for contractual obligations as opposed to
restrictions unilaterally imposed by the relevant association. 5
These proposed alternatives are certain to be compatible
with Article 48 because whatever system is finally employed will
necessarily be refined through collective bargaining between
players and clubs.57 6 The relative bargaining positions of players
571. See supra notes 9, 276-88 and accompanying text (discussing transfer system,
under which players whose contracts expire may not be employed by another club un-
less transfer fee is exchanged).
572. See supra note 410 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's acceptance of
encouraging recruitment and training of talent as legitimate goal).
573. See supra notes 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's acceptance of
maintenance of competitive and financial balance between clubs as legitimate goal).
574. Katz, supra note 1, at 378 (discussing development of amateur draft in Major
League Baseball after it became clear that farm system alone was not adequately main-
taining competitive balance).
575. See supra notes 399-416 and accompanying text (discussing Bosman, which
held that transfer rules violate Article 48).
576. See supra notes 561-62 and accompanying text (discussing need for system to
maintain sporting equilibrium between clubs and encourage recruitment and develop-
ment of new talent).
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and clubs after Bosman 577 necessitates some form of collective
agreement.578 Collective bargaining is beneficial579 and consis-
tent with TEU objectives8 ° because it shifts control of the
player's freedom of movement from the clubs to the players, in
contrast to the unilateral restrictions imposed under the transfer
system.58 Similarly, collective bargaining avoids the direct effect.
of Article 48582 that attaches to unilaterally imposed rules aimed
at regulating employment.585
Finally, any agreement should be negotiated in accordance
with the conditions of Article 85(3)584 for an exemption from
EC competition rules.585 The beneficial economic effects of col-
lective bargaining are recognized in the United States by the
non-statutory labor exemption.586 Considering these beneficial
economic effects and considering that continued competition
between clubs presupposes the existence of an effective system
to maintain the sporting equilibrium,587 it would be appropriate
for the Commission to grant an exemption to an agreement that
promotes these goals.588
577. See supra notes 563-64 and accompanying text (describing bargaining posi-
tion of players, as free agents, after Bosman).
578. See supra notes 562-63 and accompanying text (indicating that adopting alter-
natives to transfer system is in club's own interests).
579. See supra notes 327-33 and accompanying text (discussing non-statutory labor
exemption in U.S. antitrust law, which protects collective agreements from antitrust
scrutiny if their beneficial effects on labor are greater than their anti-competitive ef-
fects).
580. See supra note 43 and accompanying text (describing recurrent theme in
Community law of eliminating economic barriers between Member States).
581. See supra notes 276-91 and accompanying text (describing transfer system).
582. See Commission v. France, Case 167/73, [1974] E.C.R. 359, [1974] 2 C.M.L.R.
83 (finding direct effect of Article 48); see also supra note 391 and accompanying text
(discussing direct effect of Article 48).
583. See supra note 391 and accompanying text (discussing application of Article
48 to rules laid down by sporting associations).
584. EC Treaty, supra note 11, art. 85(3), [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 627.
585. See supra notes 165-73 and accompanying text (discussing exemption from EC
competition rules under Article 85(3)).
586. See supra notes 329-33 and accompanying text (describing non-statutory labor
exemption to U.S. antitrust law, and common application of that exemption to collec-
tive bargaining agreements in sports).
587. See supra note 406-07 and accompanying text (discussing need for competi-
tive and financial balance among clubs in sporting leagues).
588. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text (describing Commission's ex-
clusive role in granting exemptions under Article 85(3)).
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CONCLUSION
Consistent with the fundamental importance of Article 48
in the framework of the common market and the availability of
workable alternatives to the transfer system, the TEU should not
be amended to provide an exemption for sports associations
under Article 48. Amending the TEU to perpetuate the transfer
rules or the rules on foreign players would create a dangerous
precedent, threatening the very existence of the common mar-
ket by allowing an entire segment of the internal market to disre-
gard the fundamental principles of Community law designed to
eliminate economic barriers between Member States. Conse-
quently, Member States should not raise the issue of amending
the TEU to exempt sports associations from Article 48 for discus-
sion at the 1996 IGC. If the amendment is formally proposed,
the IGC should reject it entirely, to avoid creating a loophole for
management-dominated industries, such as professional sports.
The inevitable result of such a loophole would be the entrench-
ment of industry management in positions of control over the
movement of workers within the European Union merely for the
sake of management convenience in avoiding compliance with
EC laws designed to protect the common market.
